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ARTICLES 
THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE POLICE POWER 
Randy E. Barnett* 
The conservation of private rights is attained by the imposition of a 
wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as will pre-
vent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of them 
.... The power of the government to impose this restraint is called 
Police Power.' 
INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to identifying the powers of the federal govern-
ment, we know where to look. Article I of the Constitution provides a 
list. The debate is, and has always been, how to interpret the meaning 
of these provisions and how broadly or narrowly to construe that 
meaning. When it comes to the power of states over their people, the 
issue has always been shrouded in doubt. For, though the Constitu-
tion provides a list of specific limitations on state powers along with an 
enumeration of certain rights, it does not provide any written list of 
state powers or even a general statement as to their scope. In short 
the Constitution is, or at least to some appears to be, all but silent on 
the question of the proper scope of what is called the police power of 
states. 
This apparent silence has invited a fundamental choice between 
two ways of construing the scope of state power. Some have con-
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to 
Kate McFarland for her research assistance. This Article expands upon and revises 
material that will appear in RANDY E. BARNElT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (forthcoming 2004). Permission to photocopy for 
classroom use is hereby granted. 
1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 1-2 
(St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886). 
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tended that the state, being a government of "general powers," may 
do all that is not expressly prohibited by the express provisions of the 
Constitution. Others contend that, because governments with unlim-
ited power are a form of tyranny, some limits to the powers of states 
must be identified. 
One response to this is that state governments are limited, but 
only by their own state constitutions. Of course, these are not the only 
limits on state powers. Everyone concedes that even powers author-
ized by state constitutions are limited by the express prohibitions on 
state powers in Article I as well as the restrictions imposed by the Bill 
of Rights. So the claim is that, except where limited by the federal Constitu-
tion, states' powers are limited only by their constitutions. This begs 
the question of whether any additional restrictions are imposed on 
the states by the Constitution and, as we shall see, there are-in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In this Article, I will contend that the Constitution is not really 
silent at all on the proper scope of state powers; that the original 
meaning of what the Constitution says requires that state powers over 
their citizens have fairly easy to identify limits-though as with most 
constitutional provisions, applying these limits to particular cases re-
quires judgment and is not a matter of strict deductive logic. This 
account will require me to briefly review the method of interpretation 
I advocate-original meaning originalism-and its limits. These lim-
its require that interpretation of original meaning be implemented by 
means of constitutional constructions that enhance the legitimacy of 
the Constitution without violating the original meaning established by 
interpretation. I then examine the original meaning of the provision 
that provides the limit on state power: the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally I offer the construction of the scope of the police power of 
states that is consistent with that limitation: the police power of states 
includes the power to prohibit wrongful and to regulate rightful con-
duct of individuals. 2 
Throughout this Article, it is wise to be aware of an irony lurking 
behind debates among legal scholars on the proper scope of the po-
lice power of states. These powers are unwritten and, as a result, lack 
all specificity associated with the rule of law. In response to this, some 
2 I say "includes" because the police power may have other aspects as well, in 
particular, a more extensive power to regulate or r~strict the use of state owned prop-
erty. But this is an aspect of state power I will not be addressing here. I am con-
cerned instead with the general power the state has over its citizens, wholly apart from 
the powers it may exercise as a property owner in its own right. Where these two 
issues overlap to some extent is the state's power to regulate behavior in public places, 
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks. 
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argue that the powers are for most intents and purposes unlimited, 
meaning that state legislature have the power to enact what they will, 
free of any constitutional constraints imposed by the federal judiciary. 
In contrast, as I shall show, both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide an express recognition of unenumerated rights, privi-
leges or immunities retained by the people, while the Tenth 
Amendment expressly states that the powers not delegated to the fed-
eral government are reserved to the states or to the people-without 
specifying which. 
Confronted with this text, however, many of the very same schol-
ars object that because the content of these rights are unwritten or 
unspecified, these textual provisions should generally be ignored and 
forgotten (as well they have been). The objection is that recognizing 
unwritten rights provides no rule-like constraints on the powers of 
judges to strike down legislation. But they are not similarly bothered 
by giving a blank check to legislatures in the form of an unlimited 
construction of their entirely unwritten police power. The irony of 
this approach is that unwritten powers become unlimited, in contrast 
to unenumerated rights expressly reco{fnized by the Constitution, which are 
made to vanish. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
Every discussion of the meaning of the Constitution should begin 
with the writer identifying his or her method of interpretation. Even 
if that method cannot be defended completely in the particular con-
text, an author should provide some indication of the reasons for the 
adoption of the particular chosen method. Too many discussions of 
the Constitution lack what should be this obligatory preface, leaving 
the reader unable fully to assess the particular interpretation being 
offered.3 
I have argued elsewhere that a written constitution should be in-
terpreted according to its original meaning; that we are not bound by 
the original intention of its framers, but only by the original meaning 
of the words they enacted (though evidence of intention may tell us 
something about what the words meant to a member of the general 
public at the time of enactment). The justification of this approach, 
in the United States, stems from two features of the Constitution: (1) 
3 To be clear, my claim concerning the need to identify one's interpretive meth-
odology is limited to writings that advocate a particular interpretation or oppose an-
other. This need not be done if the treatment is for some other purpose, such as a 
purely historical discussion or an analysis of cases in which no interpretation of the 
Constitution itself is advocated. 
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that one of its principal purposes is to constrain those who make and 
enforce laws so as to protect the rights retained by the people, and for 
this reason, (2) it is put in writing. 
Because this is the law governing lawmaking, those who make the 
laws that are to govern the people should not be able to change the 
laws that govern them. Putting these laws over the lawmakers in writ-
ing serves to lock them in, and this "lock in" function would be de-
feated if those who make or enforce laws, or who interpret the writing, 
are free on their own to change it to something different that they 
prefer. In short, for a written constitution to perform the principal 
function for which it is put in the form of a writing, its meaning must 
remain the same until it is properly changed. And it is improper for it 
to be changed by the very people it is supposed to bind. 
By this rationale, the original meaning of the text is to be pre-
served, but not because its authors have any authority over the living. 
It is to be preserved because the system of lawmaking we currently 
have has a structural feature-the written limitation of the power of 
lawmakers. The vital function of this feature would be destroyed, to 
the detriment of the rights retained by those alive today, if the mean-
ing of the writing can be changed by those whom il is supposed to 
constrain. Originalism is justified, therefore, as an essential means of 
protecting the rights retained by the people. 
While the original meaning of the text might be demonstrably 
inconsistent with a multitude of possible outcomes, however, it may 
still not provide enough guidance to identify a single rule of law to 
apply to a particular case at hand. Indeed, it frequently will not. 
When this occurs, it becomes necessary to adopt a "construction" of 
the text that is consistent with its original meaning but not deducible 
from it. 
For example, as we shall see, the original meaning of the text 
calls for the protection of the natural liberty rights retained by the 
people along with any additional privileges or immunities created by 
the Constitution itself. In contrast, the text provides no explicit refer-
ence to the proper scope of state powers. It most assuredly does not 
say that the states have all powers not delegated to the federal govern-
ment. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment is expressly noncommittal on 
the scope of state powers when it affirms that" [t] he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."4 
Any claim concerning the proper scope of state power is, there-
fore, a construction, rather than an interpretation of the text. This is 
4 U.S. CONST.amend. X (emphasis added). 
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not to disparage it, as constitutional construction is inevitable. It is 
only that a constitutional construction is not a product of interpreta-
tion based on original meaning, except indirectly, when the original 
meaning of what the text does say is consistent with one construction, 
and inconsistent with another. 
This is the case with the police power. We shall see that the un-
limited or plenary power construction of the police power is inconsis-
tent. with both the text and original meaning of the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In contrast, the construction I shall offer, 
which is not original to me, is consistent with these express provisions. 
In addition, when choosing among possible constructions of the 
text that are consistent with its original meaning, we should choose 
that construction which enhances the legitimacy of the Constitution, 
by which I mean its ability to create a lawmaking process that binds in 
conscience or to create a duty of obedience in the citizenry. I have 
defended this conception of constitutional legitimacy elsewhere.5 By 
violating the rights retained by the people, the unlimited or plenary 
power construction of the state police power undermines rather than 
enhances the ability of constitutional lawmaking processes to produce 
laws that bind the people in conscience. In contrast, the construction 
I will propose respects the rights retained by the people and enhances 
constitutional legitimacy in the relevant sense. 
II. INTERPRETING WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS: THE ORIGINAL 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
Before the Civil War, unless a state law violated one of the ex-
pressed prohibitions in the Constitution, it could not be challenged in 
federal court. In 1833, the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Mayor oj Balti-
more,6 held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern-
ment and did not constrain the states (notwithstanding that the text 
of some of the first ten amendments contains no such limitation). 
Thus, at the founding period and for decades thereafter, the propri-
ety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny. 7 
Upon passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the con-
stitutional structure changed. States were now prohibited from 
5 See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REv. III (2003). 
6 32 u.s. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
7 Though, as will be noted below, state court judges began to scrutinize the pro-
priety of state legislation under the "law of the land" provisions in state constitutions 
to ensure that such legislation served the general public, as opposed to a faction or 
special interest. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND 
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 45-60 (1993). 
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abridging any of the "privileges or immunities" of their citizens-a 
phrase that, as we will see, included the background natural rights of 
the people along with other rights and privileges of citizenship ex-
pressly created by the Constitution. In addition, states could not de-
prive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or 
deny them the equal protection of the laws. Federal courts were now 
required to assess whether states had violated any of these 
prohibitions. 
Owing to the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, state govern-
ments no longer can claim a plenary power to restrict the liberties of 
the people subject only to their constitutions and any express restric-
tions in the original Constitution. Instead, any state abridgment of 
the privileges or immunities should be subject to challenge in federal 
court. When state legislatures restrict the liberties of the people, they 
are no more entitled to be the judge in their own case than is Con-
gress. The exercise of liberty by the citizen should not be restricted 
unless the state can show, to the satisfaction of an independent tribu-
nal of justice, that such a restriction is both necessary and proper. 
Determining the propriety of state laws is more problematic than 
with federal powers, however, because there is no list of enumerated 
powers the original meaning of which can be used to distinguish 
proper from improper exercises of power. Indeed, there is nothing in 
the Constitution that speaks to the issue of the proper scope of state 
powers. While the Tenth Amendment establishes that federal powers 
are limited to those that are enumerated, it does not say whether any 
particular power is in the hands of the states or of the people. As 
Justice Thomas has correctly observed, "[w]ith this careful last phrase, 
the Amendment avoids taking any position on the division of power 
between the state governments and the people of the States .... "8 To 
answer that question we must look elsewhere. 
Originally, the obvious places to look were state constitutions to 
see what powers a particular state had been granted.9 However, as was 
already mentioned, the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment 
complicated this by forbidding states from improperly abridging the 
privileges or immunities of their own citizens even where permitted by 
their constitutions. In determining the proper scope of state power, 
then, it becomes necessary to establish the original meaning of this 
8 U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
9 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is up to the people of each State to deter-
mine which 'reserved' powers their state government may exercise."). 
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restriction. A state may only exercise whatever degree of power is con-
sistent with these express restrictions. 
Because the evidence shows the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was, in part, a reference to natural rights, its proper interpretation 
requires an appreciation of what is meant by natural rights. This in 
turn requires that we begin our investigation into that textual injunc-
tion in the original Constitution that protected unenumerated natural 
rights from federal power: the Ninth Amendment. 
A. The Original Meaning oj the Ninth Amendment 
l. The Reason for the Ninth Amendment: The Equal Protection of 
Unenumerated Rights 
The Ninth Amendment lO was the creation of James Madison. 
Both his reason for devising it and his use of the amendment in con-
stitutional argument support the most obvious textual meaning: 
unenumerated liberties are to be treated the same as those that were 
enumerated. To the degree that enumerated rights receive protec-
tion from Congress, so too should those that were left unenumerated. 
To appreciate this, we need to begin by understanding the problem 
that the Ninth Amendment was enacted to solve. 
Until the Bill of Rights was adopted two years after the ratification 
of the Constitution, with a few exceptions, all of the rights retained by 
the people were unenumerated. There was no explicit protection for 
the rights of free speech and assembly or the rights of freedom of 
religion and of the press. During this period no one argued that the 
federal government had the power to abridge or deny these and other 
unenumerated liberties. In the absence of explicit mention in the 
Constitution, how were these rights to be protected? 
The most obvious way was by the political constraints of federal-
ism and separation of powers, which required a convergence of opin-
ions before laws could be enacted and enforced. Their protection 
also came from the fact that the powers of Congress were limited and 
enumerated. Even when Congress was ostensibly acting within its 
powers, however, the means it chose to employ might still be unneces-
sary or improper. Finally, the judiciary was to be the guardian of the 
Constitution when Congress exceeded its powers, including its law-
making power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. I I Taken to-
10 V.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
11 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 V. 
PA.J. CONST. L. 183 (2003). 
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gether, these structural and textual constraints prevented whole 
categories of rights violations without having to discuss the rights 
themselves and contributed importantly to the legitimacy of the origi-
nal Constitution. 
When the opponents of the Constitution objected to the absence 
of a bill of rights, the Federalists argued that this additional protection 
was unnecessary because the Congress was not given any power to vio-
late the rights retained by the people. "Why, for instance," asked 
Hamilton, "should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be 
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be im-
posed?"12 As I shall discuss at greater length below, the Federalists 
also argued that adding a bill of rights would be dangerous because 
the rights or liberties of the people were unenumerable and any rights 
that would be omitted would be rendered insecure. 
Despite their arguments, the Federalists were forced to promise a 
bill of rights to obtain enough support for ratification. When James 
Madison sought to honor this commitment in the first Congress, he 
was faced with solving the difficulty that he and his Federalist allies 
had noted just two years earlier. As soon as any particular rights or 
liberties were explicitly enumerated, the status of those left out of the 
enumeration became unclear. Were only the enumerated rights to be 
protected and the unenumerated rights left unprotected? By "unpro-
tected" I mean subject to being surrendered up to Congress to be 
abridged or denied at its sole discretion. 
Here is how Madison stated the problem when he introduced his 
proposed amendments to the House: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerat-
ing particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage 
those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it 
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not sin-
gled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the Gen-
eral Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of 
the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but I conceive, that it 
may be guarded against. 13 
Madison then referred the members to the portion of his propo-
sal that read: 
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in 
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish 
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed.,1961). 
13 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
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the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to 
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as ac-
tual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater 
caution.14 
437 
Eventually, all of Madison's proposals were referred to a select 
committee of the House, which decided to list the amendments after 
the body of the original Constitution rather than insert them within 
the text. From this committee emerged the current text of the Ninth 
Amendment, which replaced the "diminish the just importance" lan-
guage with the stronger phrase "deny or disparage." While there is 
much that is controversial about the Ninth Amendment, this story of 
its origin and enactment is not. 
What do Madison's original proposal, and his explanation of it, 
add to our understanding of the Ninth Amendment? First of all, 
Madison's placement of this provision is revealing. He put it at the 
end of the list of specific individual rights that he proposed be in-
serted in Article 1, Section 9, immediately after the two individual 
rights already listed there-the rights of habeas corpus and the rights 
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws-but before the other 
prohibitions of government power listed in Section 9 that are not eas-
ily conceived as individual rights, such as the prohibition on granting 
titles of nobility. This supports a conclusion that it refers to the same 
sorts of individual rights that were explicitly enumerated in the Con-
stitution and that it was to be accorded the same importance as the 
other provisions in that section. 
Then there are the words of the original proposal that were 
quoted above, which convey information about the nature of both 
enumerated and unenumerated rights omitted from the otherwise 
stronger final version. Owing to his tendency to run parallel ideas to-
gether in a single sentence, Madison's original proposal is a bit diffi-
cult to follow. When disentangled, however, it shows clearly that the 
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights were of at least two kinds. 
First were those enumerated rights that provided additional or 
"actual limitations" on the delegated powers beyond those that previ-
ously existed. For example, prior to its amendment, the Constitution 
did not require jury trials in civil cases. In his speech to the House, 
Madison categorized these actual limitations as "positive rights" and 
gave the example of trial by jury.15 Second were those rights that were 
14 1 id. at 435. 
15 1 id. at 436. For this item, Madison's notes read: "4. positive rights resultg. as 
trial by jury." Madison's Notes JOT Amendments Speech 1789, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY 
THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64 (Randy E. Bar-
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enumerated "merely for greater caution." As Madison explained, 
these refer to "those rights which are retained when particular powers 
are given up to be exercised by the Legislature."16 Crucially, in his 
handwritten notes to this speech, Madison refers to these "rights 
which are retained" as "natural rights" and gives as an example of such 
a natural right the freedom of speechP 
Thus, according to how Madison used the term "retained" rights, 
we know that the "other" unenumerated rights "retained by the pea-
pIe" mentioned in the Ninth Amendment fall into the second cate-
gory of his original proposal. They are the natural rights "which are 
retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the 
Legislature."18 A few of these rights were included in the Bill of 
Rights "for greater caution" but most were left unenumerated. They 
were not left textually unprotected, however. The textual source of 
that protection was, initially, the limited powers scheme and the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause,19 and soon thereafter the enumeration of 
certain rights coupled with the Ninth Amendment for the others. 
Madison's speech to the House also clarifies how constitutional 
rights, whether enumerated or unenumerated, relate to the delegated 
powers. Constitutional rights can limit both the ends of government 
as well as the means by which the legitimate ends of government are 
executed. As Madison explained (in another sentence combining 
parallel ideas), "the great object in view is to limit and qualify the pow-
ers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases 
in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particu-
lar mode."20 Disentangling this passage, we find that ends constraints 
" limit . .. the powers of Government" by specifying when "the Govern-
ment ought not to act." Means constraints" qualify the powers of Govern-
ment" by specifying when "Government ought ... to act only in a 
particular mode." 
nett ed., 1989) [hereinafter RIGHTS RETAINED]. The next type of rights mentioned 
both in his speech as delivered and in his notes are 
positive rights, which may result from the nature of the compact. Trial by 
jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a 
social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as essen-
tial to secure the liberty of the people as anyone of the pre-existent rights of 
nature. 
1 ANNALS OF CONGo 436 Ooseph Gales ed., 1789). 
16 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 437 Ooseph Gales ed., 1789). 
17 Madison's notes read: "Contents of Bill of Rhts .... 3. natural rights retained as 
speach." Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, supra note 15, at 64. 
18 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 437 Ooseph Gales ed., 1789). 
19 See generally Barnett, supra note II. 
20 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 437 Ooseph Gales ed., 1789). 
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As an example of improper means, Madison offered the use of 
general warrants: "The General Government has a right to pass all 
laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for en-
forcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may 
not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose ... ?"21 
As Madison's example suggests, the Necessary and Proper Clause ex-
acerbates the means-end problem within a scheme of delegated pow-
ers. Authorizing the Congress "[ t] 0 make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof'22 
heightens the prospect that Congress or some department or officer 
of the general government may pursue a delegated enumerated end 
by means that infringe upon the rights retained by the people. There-
fore, some regulation of the means employed to achieve enumerated 
governmental ends must supplement the device of enumerating 
powers. 
In his speech, Madison explicitly linked the abuse of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause with the need for constitutional rights to con-
strain the means chosen by the general government: 
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed, 
they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government 
keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with 
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain ex-
tent, ... because in the Constitution of the United States, there is a 
clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers 
vested in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof .... 23 
As the Supreme Court stated in Dennis v. United States,24 "[t]he ques-
tion with which we are concerned here is not whether Congress has 
such power, but whether the means which it has employed conflict with the 
First and Fifth Amendments to th~ Constitution."25 
In addition to placing actual or additional limits on the means by 
which government can accomplish its legitimate ends, Madison identi-
fied a second power-constraining function of constitutional rights: 
21 1 id. at 438. 
22 u.s. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
23 1 ANNALS OF CONG 438 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
24 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
25 Id. at 501 (emphasis added); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 
112 (1959) ("Congress ... must exercise its powers subject to the ... relevant limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights."). 
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constitutional rights provide a "redundant" or cautionary safeguard in 
the event that delegated powers of government are given an overly 
expansive interpretation. Constitutional rights can help hold govern-
ment to its legitimate enumerated ends in two ways. Rights can pre-
vent the adoption of an expansive interpretation of enumerated 
powers in the first instance. Failing this, once a power has been expan-
sively interpreted, the direct judicial protection of enumerated and 
unenumerated rights holds government within some limits. 
Madison himself used the Ninth Amendment to check an expan-
sive construction of delegated powers during the debate over the con-
stitutionality of the national bank. Near the end of his speech in 
which he argued that the powers to incorporate a bank and grant it a 
monopoly were beyond those granted to Congress under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, he observed: "The latitude of interpretation re-
quired by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the 
Constitution itself."26 As one authority for this "rule" of interpreta-
tion, Madison cited the Ninth Amendment: 
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at 
least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of 
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude 
now contended for .... He read several of the articles proposed, 
remarking particularly on the 11th [the Ninth Amendment] and 
12th [the Tenth Amendment]; the farmer, as guarding against a lati-
tude of interpretation; the latter, as excluding every source of power 
not within the Constitution itself. 27 
Thus, Madison viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as play-
ing distinct roles. Madison viewed the Tenth Amendment as authority 
for the rule that Congress could exercise only a delegated power. For 
example, Congress could not establish a post office or raise and sup-
port armies without a delegation of power to pursue these ends.28 In 
26 2 ANNALS OF CONGo 1899 (1791) (emphasis added). 
27 2 id. at 1901 (emphasis added). The numbering of the amendments changed 
because the first two amendments proposed by Congress were not ratified by the 
states. So what came to be called the First Amendment was originally the third 
amendment on the list submitted to the states. At the time Madison spoke, however, 
this outcome was not yet known. One of these two moribund proposals-which regu-
lated congressional pay increases-became the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992 
when it was finally ratified by a sufficient number of states. 
28 The Tenth Amendment is redundant of the list of enumerated powers coupled 
with the first sentence of Article I, which begins: "All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (em-
phasis added). For this reason, whereas Madison highlighted the importance of the 
Ninth Amendment in his Bill of Rights speech, he viewed the Tenth Amendment as 
largely superfluous: "Perhaps other. words may define this more precisely than the 
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contrast, Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing author-
ity for a rule against the loose construction of these powers-espe-
cially the Necessary and Proper Clause-when legislation affected the 
rights retained by the people. As Madison concluded in his bank 
speech: "In fine, if the power were in the Constitution, the immediate 
exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the exercise of it involves the 
'1 f . "29 gm t 0 usurpatIOn. . . . 
Three years later, in 1794, Madison would again argue in Con-
gress that the unenumerated rights retained by the people directly 
constrained congressional power. When Congress sought to censure 
the activities of certain self-created societies for their participation in 
the Whiskey Rebellion earlier that year, Madison contended that 
"[w]hen the people have formed a Constitution, they retain those 
rights which they have not expressly delegated."30 Here Madison was 
asserting that the unenumerated retained right to hold opinions con-
strained the power of Congress to issue a censure, in the same manner 
as "the liberty of speech, and of the press."31 Indeed, "the censorial 
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Govern-
ment over the people."32 Strong words on behalf of supporters of 
insurrection. 
Madison's uses of the Ninth Amendment show that, like the natu-
ral rights that were enumerated, the unenumerated rights retained by 
the people provide a twofold check on government power. Their exis-
tence argues against a latitudinarian interpretation of enumerated 
powers when those powers are used to restrict the liberties of the peo-
ple; and the direct protection of the liberties of the people also effec-
tively limits both the ends of government and the means by which 
these ends can legitimately be pursued. This from the man who de-
vised the Ninth Amendment. 
In his treatise on the Constitution, St. George Tucker, the editor 
of the American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries and one of the 
leading jurists and constitutional scholars of the founding era, offered 
a similar interpretation of the Ninth Amendment (while it was still 
referred to as the Eleventh Amendment). He began his explanation 
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments by connecting them with the 
enumeration of powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause. He 
whole of the instrument now does. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but 
there can be no harm in making such a declaration .... " 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 441 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
29 2 ANNALS OF CONGo 1902 (1791) (emphasis added). 
30 4 id. at 934 (1794). 
31 4 id. 
32 4 id. 
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noted that "[a]ll the powers of the federal government," were "either 
expressly enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of 
some enumerated power."33 He then described, as "one of the rules 
of construction which sound reason has adopted" the principle "that, 
as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so 
enumeration weakens it, in cases not enumerated."34 This meant that, 
because the powers of government are enumerated, the inference 
from the text is that government is to have no powers beyond those 
expressly provided. 
Tucker then offered a rule of construction that follows from this 
inference: 
[I] t follows, as a regular consequence, that every power which con-
cerns the right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it 
may operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, and for 
his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, the 
avowed object of the constitution .... 35 
Tucker shared with Madison the view that the Ninth Amendment 
provided an argument against a latitudinarian interpretation of the 
delegated powers, but he also made even clearer that the end of con-
stitutional construction is the protection of individual liberty: both a 
"strict construction" of powers and "liberal construction" of rights. 
Tucker was proposing something very much like what I call a "Pre-
sumption of Liberty."36 
2. The Rights "Retained by the People" Are Natural Liberty Rights 
So the rights retained by the people are to be treated on a par 
with those that are enumerated. What exactly are these unenumer-
ated rights? I have already referred to them as "natural rights." The 
founding generation universally believed that laws should not violate 
the inherent or "natural" rights of those to whom they are directed. 
This is not to say that universal agreement existed about the precise 
content of these rights, though I believe there was considerable con-
sensus about such rights in the abstract. Nor did everyone agree about 
the remedy that was appropriate for their violation. Still, the basic 
33 St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAws OF 
THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA app. at 307-08 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch 
& Abraham Small 1803) .. 
34 Id. at 308. 
35 Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 
36 See BARNETT, sufrra note * (manuscript at 253-69, on file with author). 
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concept of natural rights was clear: Natural or inherent rights are the 
rights persons have independent of those they are granted by govern-
ment and by which the justice or propriety of governmental com-
mands are to be judged. That the founding generation's commitment 
to natural rights is expressed in the Ninth Amendment's reference to 
"rights retained by the people" is overwhelming. 
Let us begin with James Madison's speech to the House introduc-
ing his proposed amendments, including the provision that eventually 
became the Ninth Amendment. When explaining to the House the 
nature of the various rights contained in the amendments he was pro-
posing, Madison stated that" [i] n [some] instances, they specify those 
rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be 
exercised by the Legislature."37 Madison's notes for this part of his 
speech read: "[c]ontents of Bill ofRhts .... 3. natural rights retained 
as speach."38 In other words, for Madison even some of the rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, such as the freedom of speech, were 
natural "retained" rights. 
Additional evidence that the term "retained" rights referred to 
natural rights can be found in the deliberations of the select commit-
tee that the House of Representatives appointed to draft amendments 
to the Constitution and on which Madison served. A draft bill of 
rights authored by fellow select committee member Representative 
Roger Sherman was found in the 1980s among Madison's papers. 
Sherman's second amendment read as follows: 
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them 
when they enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in 
matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happi-
ness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments 
with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their 
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or re-
monstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they 
Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united States.39 
Along the same lines, Madison proposed to Congress that the fol-
lowing be added as a prefix to the Constitution, "[t]hat Government is 
instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; 
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of 
37 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added). 
38 See Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech 1789, supra note 15, at 64. 
39 &grrr Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 15, at 
351 (emphasis added). 
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acqumng and using property, and generally of pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety."40 
Indeed, the evidence both that the founding generation was com-
mitted to natural rights, and that this commitment is reflected in the 
words of the Ninth Amendment, is so overwhelming that few deny it. 
Instead, the argument is sometimes made that the only natural rights 
that may be protected by courts are those that were specifically enu-
merated in the Constitution. For the moment, however, I wish to ex-
amine why the Framers did not include a complete list of natural 
rights in the Constitution. The simple reason is that they thought it 
would be impossible to do so. Understanding why will help to illumi-
nate the nature of the rights "retained by the people." 
When opponents to the proposed constitution objected that it 
lacked a bill of rights, defenders argued vociferously that any effort to 
enumerate rights would be dangerous because the rights of the peo-
ple were literally boundless. James Wilson, a member of the Constitu-
tional Convention and the first professor of law at the University of 
Pennsylvania, was an ardent adherent of natural rights. In his lectures 
on jurisprudence delivered between 1790 and 1792, he explicitly re-
jected the views of both Edmund Burke and William Blackstone and 
contended instead that "[g]overnment, in my humble opinion, 
should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural 
rights of its members; and every government, which has not this in 
view, as its principal object, is not a government of the legitimate 
kind."41 Nor for Wilson were these mere "theoretical" or "philosophi-
cal" rights with no real bite: 
I go farther; and now proceed to show, that in peculiar instances, in 
which those rights can receive neither protection nor reparation 
from civil government, they are, notwithstanding its institution, enti-
tled still to that defence, and to those methods of recovery, which 
are justified and demanded in a state of nature. The defence of 
one's self, justly called the primary law of nature, is not, nor can it 
be abrogated by any regulation of municipallaw.42 
Nevertheless, when defending the Constitution against those who 
complained about the absence of a bill of rights, Wilson explained, 
40 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 433-34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
41 JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 296, 307 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896). 
42 Id. at 335 (citations omitted). Wilson's lectures also undermine the claim that 
by the time of the Constitution, AnIericans had lost their Lockean and revolutionary 
ardor for natural rights in favor of a more conservative Blackstonian positivism that 
favored legislative supremacy. 
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"there are very few who understand the whole of these rights."43 
None of the classical natural rights theorists, he said, claim to provide 
"a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men 
and as citizens .... Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sir, 
that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted such 
a thing."44 And before the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wil-
son observed: 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be 
particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution 
is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumer-
ation, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. 
The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all 
implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of 
the people would be rendered incomplete.45 
The same argument was made by Charles Pinckney in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives: 
[W]e had no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution: for, as we 
might perhaps have omitted the enumeration of some of our rights, 
it might hereafter be said we had delegated to the general govern-
ment a power to take away such of our rights as we had not 
enumerated .... 46 
Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell stated a similar argu-
ment to the North Carolina ratification convention: "Let anyone 
make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will imme-
diately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it."47 
To today's ears, this statement is startling. No matter how long a 
list of rights anyone might write, Iredell claimed he could add twenty 
or thirty more. What conception of rights could possibly lead some-
one of Iredell's stature to make such a claim in so visible a forum? 
What conception of rights would lead a natural rights theorist like 
Wilson to deny that anyone in the Constitutional Convention would 
have presumed to enumerate all the rights retained by the people? 
And how could people with so expansive a view ·of rights, and who 
43 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Uonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1836) 454 
[hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
44 2 id. 
45 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388 
(Merril Jensen ed., 1976). 
46 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 316. 
47 4 id. at 167 (quoting James Iredell at the North Carolina ratification conven-
tion, July 29, 1788). 
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viewed them as so vitally important, have eventually adopted so short a 
list as those contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights? 
One clue is to be found in the examples of natural "retained" 
rights provided by Roger Sherman in his proposed second amend-
ment: "rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring prop-
erty, and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and 
publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably 
assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to Govern-
ment by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances." Each of 
the rights on Sherman's list-which was not intended to be exhaus-
tive ("such are")-are liberties or freedoms to believe or act in certain 
ways. They are not positive claims on government or on others. 
The claim that natural rights are unenumerable and dangerous 
to enumerate makes complete sense if the term "inherent rights" or 
"natural rights" is used as a kind of synonym for "liberties" or Liberty 
(as distinct from license). That the term "natural rights" was synony-
mous with "liberties" is also exemplified in the official letter to Con-
gress by the members of the Constitutional Convention who wrote 
that" [iJ ndividuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty 
to preserve the rest. . .. It is at all times difficult to draw with preci-
sion the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and 
those which may be reserved .... "48 Other direct evidence of the 
interchangeability of (natural) rights and liberties could be 
produced.49 
According to this conception, natural rights define a private do-
main within which persons may do as they please, provided their con-
duct does not encroach upon the rightful domain of others. As long 
as their actions remain within this rightful domain, other persons-
including persons calling themselves government officials-should 
not interfere without a compelling justification. Because people have 
a right to do whatever they please within the boundari~s defined by 
natural rights, this means that the rights retained by the people are 
limited only by their imagination and could never be completely spec-
ified or enumerated. 
48 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
627 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840) (emphasis added). I shall return to this quota-
tion and its reference to "surrendered" rights in the next section of this Article. 
49 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 201-02 (citing speech of Oliver 
Wolcott to the Connecticut ratitying convention, Jan. 18, 1788, discussing whether the 
proposed constitution "secures the liberties of the people, or whether its tendency be 
unfavorable to the rights of a free people"). 2 id. at 311 ("What is government itself 
but a restraint upon the natural rights of the people? What constitution was ever de-
vised that did not operate as a restraint on their original liberties?") (emphasis added). 
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This conception of rights as open-ended liberties is illustrated by 
an exchange that occurred during the debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives over the wording of what eventually became part of the First 
Amendment. At one juncture in the debate, Representative Theodore 
Sedgwick criticized the select committee's inclusion of the right of as-
sembly on the grounds that "it is a self-evident, unalienable right 
which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be 
called in question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to de-
scend to such minutia .... "50 Representative Egbert Benson replied 
to Sedgwick that "[t]he committee who framed this report proceeded 
on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they con-
ceived them to be inherent; and all they meant to provide against was 
their being infringed by the Government."51 
Sedgwick's response to Benson is revealing of the conception of 
rights held generally at the time: 
[I]f the committee were governed by that general principle, they 
might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they 
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat 
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed 
when he thought proper ., .. 52 
Notice that Sedgwick was not denying that one did indeed have a nat-
ural right to wear one's hat or go to bed when one pleased. To the 
contrary, he equated these "inherent" rights with the right of assem-
bly, which he characterized as "self-evident" and "unalienable."53 
Indeed, Representative John Page's reply to Sedgwick both made 
this equation of liberty rights explicit and showed that there was no 
disagreement that "inherent" or natural rights was a reference to an 
open-ended liberty. 
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a 
man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before 
the face of authority; people have also been prevented from assem-
bling together on their lawful occasions, therefore it is well to guard 
against such stretches of authority, by inserting the privilege in the 
declaration of rights.54 
Note too the use of the term "privilege." 
50 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
51 1 id. at 731-32. 
52 1 id. at 732. 
53 1 id. at 73l. 
54 1 id. (statement of John Page). 
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Sedgwick's point was that the Constitution should not be clut-
tered with a potentially endless list of trifling rights55 that "would 
never be called in[to] question"56 and were not "intended to be in-
fringed."57 Sedgwick's argument implicitly assumes that the "self-evi-
dent, unalienable," and inherent liberty rights retained by the people 
are unnumerable because the human imagination is limitless. All the 
actions one might take with what is rightfully his or hers can never be 
specified or reduced to a list. It includes the right to wear a hat, to get 
up when one pleases and go to bed when one thinks proper, to 
scratch one's nose when it itches (and even when it doesn't), to eat 
steak when one has a taste for it, or take a sip of Diet Mountain Dew 
when one is thirsty. Make any list of liberty rights you care to and one 
can always add twenty or thirty more. 
The problem, therefore, with any explicit protection of these lib-
erties is that the liberty of the people can never be completely enu-
merated or listed. An enumeration of rights is likely to be taken as 
evidence that the people surrendered up to the general government 
any liberty that is not on the list. With the inevitable danger created 
by any limited enumeration of unlimited rights specifically in mind, 
James Madison devised what became the Ninth Amendment. 
That Madison and Sherman spoke of "retained" rights and that 
this word is used in the Constitution also supports the view that natu-
ral rights are liberty rights. For these are rights that people possess 
before they form a government and therefore retain; they are not the 
"positive" rights created by government. To be clear, I am not claim-
ing that all constitutional rights are liberty rights. On the contrary, 
there are unquestionably positive rights created by the Constitution, 
and by other laws, and enforceable duties to respect these rights that 
government owes its citizens. I am claiming only that the natural 
"rights ... retained by the people" to which the Ninth Amendment 
refers are liberty rights. 
B. Did the People "Surrender" Their Natural Liberty Rights? 
Because the evidence of the founding generation's widespread 
commitment to natural rights is undeniable, some point to statements 
saying that people give up some of their natural rights when they 
enter into society and form a government. They also point to laws that 
restricted freedom as evidence that natural rights were not thought to 
55 For a discussion of the founding generation's view of "trivial" rights, see Philip 
A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1994). 
56 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 731 Uoseph Gales ed., 1789). 
57 1 id. at 732. 
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impo~e any legal or enforceable constraints on government. Some-
times it is claimed that the professed commitment to natural rights 
was rhetoric to justify a revolution, but when it came to governance, 
this rhetoric was muted or abandoned entirely. 
There is no question that the Founders sometimes spoke of sur-
rendering one's natural rights. They also enacted laws that some, 
then and now, might think violated natural rights. If, however, we 
approach these statements and practices with the same sympathy for 
natural rights that was felt by the founding generation we may find 
that they are recoricilable with a strong commitment to the liberty 
rights retained by the people. This account of natural rights will also 
be crucial to understanding how the Fourteenth Amendment could 
protect the liberty rights of citizens without giving the federal govern-
ment complete control over matters ordinarily regulated by state law. 
Let us begin with statements saying that one gives up one's natu-
ral rights when one enters into society or when one forms a govern-
ment. Such statements were surely common. "What is government 
itself but a restraint upon the natural rights of the people?"58 rhetori-
cally asked a member of the New York ratification convention. "What 
constitution was ever devised that did not operate as a restraint on 
their originalliberties?"59 Robert Barnwell asserted to the South Caro-
lina ratification convention that "in the compacts which unite men 
into society, it always is necessary to give up a part of our natural rights 
to secure the remainder . . . . "60 
Sometimes these statements may even mean what they appear to 
say. Then, as now, there is not complete unanimity on any issue if we 
move beyond abstractions and generalities. But for every statement to 
this effect there are many more that refer to the natural rights still 
possessed by the people. This is significant because, when these state-
ments were made, popular governments existed and citizens were not 
thought to be in a state of nature.61 
58 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at ~11. Notice, too, that this statement also 
equates "natural rights" with liberty. 
59 2 id. 
60 4 id. at 295 (statement of Robert Barnwell at the South Carolina convention, 
Jan. 17, 1788). 
61 For the founding generation, the "state of nature" described the relationship 
between two or more persons who lack an established, common legal authority. See 
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 326 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690) ("[W]here-ever any two Men are, who have no standing Rule, and 
common Judge to Appeal to on Earth for the determination of Controversies of Right 
betwixt them, there they are still in the state of Nature, and under all the inconve-
niences of it."). Therefore, because they were subject to no common law and subject 
to no common magistrate, princes or heads of state might still be considered in a state 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 450 2003-2004
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
Typical is the statement by the ratification convention of Virginia 
that formally accompanied its ratification of the Constitution-a state-
ment also copied and adopted by the ratification conventions of 
North Carolina and Rhode Island: "That there are certain natural 
rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot de-
prive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."62 To 
make sense of natural rights we should not use the aforementioned 
sorts of statements to discredit statements like these. Rather, we 
should appeal to a conception of natural rights that reconciles them 
both; and there is more than one way to reconcile them. 
1. Surrendering Only a Portion of Our Natural Rights 
First, most references to giving up one's natural rights when en-
tering into society say, as does Barnwell's, that one surrenders only "a 
part of our natural rights"63 while retaining others. Only those rights 
whose alienation is necessary to form a government are yielded. Typi-
cal of this idea is the official letter to Congress by the members of the 
Constitutional Convention (which I cited earlier to illustrate how the 
word "rights" was s)'TIonymous with the word "liberty"):64 
It is obviously impracticable in the foederal [sic] government of 
these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, 
and yet provide for the interest and safety of all-Individuals enter-
ing into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The 
magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and 
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times diffi-
cult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be 
surrendered, and those which may be reserved . . . .65 
What supposedly follows from statements about surrendering nat-
ural rights is that, despite the fact they are devised to constrain gov-
ernments, natural rights no longer appear to operate as an effective 
of nature with respect to each other. Furthermore, Locke contended that absolute 
monarchs "however intitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please, is as much in 
the state of Nature, with all under his Dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind." Id. 
62 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 657 (recounting George Wythe's June 
27, 1788 oral report listing the amendments to be considered for the proposed consti-
tution). Notice how the draft bill of rights by Roger Sherman mirrors this statement 
except for the use by Sherman of the word "retained," which links this sort of state-
ment to the rights "retained by the people" in the Ninth Amendment. 
63 4 id. at 295 (emphasis added). 
64 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
65 MADISON, supra note 48, at 627 (emphasis added). 
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constraint on government. This conclusion is unwarranted. At the 
time of the Founding, almost no one claimed or believed that one 
surrenders all one's natural rights up to government, but only those 
that were necessary. One cannot infer, then, from the fact that some 
natural rights were surrendered up, that other rights still retained by 
the people can be denied or disparaged with impunity. 
Rather, the rights that are retained remain the measure of 
whether government is acting properly or improperly in the exercise 
of its delegated powers. As Madison explained to the Constitutional 
Convention, though the national government was formed to accom-
plish a variety of objects or ends, first among them was "the necessity 
of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the 
steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils 
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this 
convention."66 
2. Exchanging Natural for Civil Rights 
As will be discussed at greater length below, the most important 
power surrendered to government is what John Locke and others 
called "the executive power" and what is sometimes called the "police 
power." This is the power to enforce or "police" one's rights when 
they have been violated by others. Indeed, Locke argued that it was 
the "inconvenience" of exercising the executive power in the state of 
nature that justified the creation of an "impartial magistrate"-that is, 
government. 
The particular problem with individuals retaining the executive 
power is that they are then the judges in their own cases. 
I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the 
Inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be 
Great, where Men may be Judges in their own Case, since 'tis easily 
to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an 
Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.67 
When "surrendering" one's executive power to government, how-
ever, one receives in return a "civil" right to have one's retained lib-
erty rights protected by the police power now in the hands of the civil 
government. This civil right to "the protection of the laws" is the root 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
66 [d. at 76. 
67 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 276. 
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mandates that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."68 
Thus, in return for the surrendered natural right of enforcement, 
government assumes a positive obligation to protect the unsur-
rendered rights retained by the people. Those retained rights remain 
a measure of the propriety of government enforcement, since it is for 
their protection that the executive power is surrendered in the first 
instance. As Locke explained: 
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property 
without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the 
end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it 
necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Prop-
erty, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entring 
into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too 
gross an absurdity for any Man to own .... Hence it is a mistake to 
think, that the Supreme or Legislative Power of any Commonwealth, 
can do what it will, and dispose of the Estates of the Subject arbitrar-
ily, or take any part of them at pleasure.69 
But even this account of exchanging natural for civil rights un-
derestimates the role played by natural rights after persons enter into 
civil society. 
3. The Agency Theory of Government 
To understand better how delegated governmental powers can 
be squared with retained rights, those seeking historical context must 
also take into account the law governing agency relationships or what 
is still sometimes referred to as the law of "master and servant."70 The 
Founders were accomplished private lawyers, familiar with eighteenth 
century agency law and, not coincidentally, they'also often professed 
their belief in the "agency theory" of government. The idea that gov-
ernment officials are the agents or servants and the people are the 
principals or masters, however quaint it may seem to political sophisti-
cates today, was widely held. BerUamin Franklin articulated this popu-
68 U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Govern-
ment: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE LJ. 507 (1991). 
69 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 360-61. 
70 The rhetoric of "master/servant" is today limited to doctrines governing em-
ployer-employee relationships and primarily for when employers are liable for the 
tortious acts of their employees, as opposed to when agents may bind their principals 
to contracts. See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAw OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 102 (2d ed. 1990) ("[AJ servant is one who works physically 
for another, subject to the control of that other who is called a master."). 
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lar view to the Constitutional Convention: "In free Governments the 
rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns."71 
By definition, a principal "surrenders" certain powers to her 
agent. If I designate you my agent to sell my car, you now are in pos-
session of the power to sell, which formerly only I possessed. It is even 
possible that I delegate my exclusive power to sell the car to you and 
that, by the terms of our agreement, I no longer may rightfully sell the 
car to a third party. Think of authors who routinely give an exclusive 
license to a publisher to publish an article or book, which the author 
may then not republish on his or her own. 
Yet, just because certain powers (or rights) are delegated does 
not entail that the agent is now the master. For, according to agency 
law, the agent is to exercise those powers only (1) "on behalf of' and 
(2) "subject to the control of' the master or principal,72 Of course, 
the principal does not literally control the behavior of the agent-
there would be no advantage to entering into a principal-agent rela-
tionship were that the case. Instead, the agent must yield to the con-
trol of the principal when the principal exerts it. And even when 
operating on his own, the agent must always exercise the powers dele-
gated to him "on behalf' of the interests of the principal and can be 
held responsible for any breach of this fiduciary duty. 
It would be more accurate and much neater if we were to speak 
not of rights delegated to government but only of powers. Unfortu-
nately, language then, as now, is not always used with precision. 
Though it must be admitted that statements can be found that speak 
of alienated "rights" when "powers" would have been the better term, 
one thing is remarkable: The Framers of the Constitution were rigor-
ously consistent in referring to the "powers" of government and to the 
"rights" of the people. The Constitution refers to powers-and only 
powers-being delegated to government, whereas rights are retained 
by the people (and powers reserved to them as well). The best theory 
of this usage is that only powers, not rights, are delegated to govern-
ment and that all rights are retained by the people as a measure of the 
propriety of the exercise of governmental power. 
4. Regulating the Exercise of Inalienable Rights 
Then there is the matter of "inalienable" rights, that is, rights that 
cannot be surrendered. How can this concept be squared with state-
ments about surrendering natural rights and the enactment of free-
71 MADISON, supra note 48, at 371 (statement of Benjamin Franklin). 
72 For a general overview of agency law, see Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed 
Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987). 
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dom-constraining laws? One way to understand this is to think of 
inalienable rights as somehow more fundamental or important than 
other trivial or trifling natural rights, and then posit that, while the 
latter can be surrendered and restricted, the former cannot. How-
ever, this formulation is misleading. 
It is better to say that inalienable rights are more abstract than 
other specific natural rights or liberties. These inalienable abstract 
rights can be classified as the rights of several property, freedom of 
contract, self-defense, first possession, and restitution.73 Together, 
these rights define a boundary or jurisdictional space within which 
people should be free to make their own choices. 
The specific choices people make within this jurisdictional space 
are the more particular "natural" rights or liberties. For example, the 
abstract and inalienable right to the possession, use, and enjoyment of 
several property includes the particular right to read a book in one's 
own house or to go to bed when one wishes, though such specific 
"trivial" rights are impossible to list and may themselves be alienated. 
Moreover, my inalienable property rights to the exclusive use and en-
joyment of my body do not prevent me from waiving this right by con-
senting to get in the ring with Muhammad Ali. 
It is common to see statements to the effect that one's right to do 
something is subject to the "laws of the land." For example, while 
Locke argued that one completely surrendered the executive power 
to enforce one's rights by punishing one's attacker or extracting repa-
rations from him, he contended that one "gives up" the natural right 
of self-preservation "to be regulated by Laws made by the Society, so far 
forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall 
require. "74 
Such statements raise the issue of the reasonable regulation of 
one's natural rights. Assume that there is a natural and inalienable 
right to possess, use, and dispose of several property. Suppose that 
someone wants to transfer her property rights in a tract of land to her 
son after her death so she executes a document called a "will." How 
this document will be interpreted and enforced in a court of law re-
quires the articulation of certain rules or laws governing what consti-
tutes a valid will. Requirements of formality, for example, may be 
devised specifying the need for two or more witnesses to a signature. 
Such rules or laws regularize will-making. The power to regulate will-
73 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRucrURE OF LIBERTI': JUSTICE AND THE 
RULE OF LAw (1998) (defending these as the principal abstract natural rights because 
they address the pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power). 
74 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 352 (emphasis added). 
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making in this sense does not, however, include the power to rewrite 
wills to contradict the demonstrable intent of the testator, nor the 
power to prohibit the making of wills altogether, nor the power to 
confiscate a percentage of the decedent's property in estate "taxes." 
That the reasonable regulation of natural rights is essential to 
their efficacious exercise and enforcement in civil society does not en-
tail that these rights are surrendered completely to the government. 
On the contrary, these rights remain the object and measure of any 
regulations. That is, the protection and facilitation of everyone's re-
tained rights in civil society is the purpose of any "police" regulation 
by law, and this object or end is the measure of whether a particular 
regulation is or is not reasonable. 
By this account, some natural rights can be surrendered to gov-
ernment in order to better secure those that are retained. As was said 
by Samuel Nasson, at the Massachusetts ratification convention: 
"When I give up any of my natural rights, it is for the security of the 
rest."75 But it is better to adopt the terminology of the Constitution 
itself and speak of (limited) powers being delegated by the people-
or principals or masters-to their servants or agents in government. 
The rights that are retained provide the measure of how these powers 
should be exercised. The "police power" to enforce or regulate a re-
tained right is not the power to confiscate, prohibit, infringe, or 
abridge its exercise. 
Locke made a similar point when he claimed that whatever lib-
erty or powers are given up when one enters society are given up 
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself 
his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be supposed 
to change his condition with the intention to be worse) the power 
of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be sup-
pos'd to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure 
every ones Property by providing against [the] ... defects ... that 
made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie.76 
It is also worth noting that Locke distinguished the two powers 
that were given up, either entirely (the executive power) or to be reg-
ulated by law (the power of self-preservation), from a third species of 
natural rights that he does not claim a person surrenders either upon 
entering civil society or upon forming a government. This third spe-
75 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 134 (statement by Samuel Nasson at the 
Massachusetts convention, Feb. 1, 1788). 
76 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 353. 
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cies is "the liberty he has of innocent Delights."77 Provided that such 
pleasures do not unjustly interfere with the rights of others, the civil 
authority has no role in the prohibition or even the regulation of "in-
nocent Delights." 
Few who caution us against taking the Founders' expressed com-
mitment to natural rights out of context address the views of those 
who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if their commitment to 
natural rights was more "liberal" and less "republican" than the Foun-
ders', it is they-not the Founders-who wrote the Fourteenth 
Amendment. When we consider the protections of "privileges or im-
munities" provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is their concep-
tion-not the Founders'-that represents the original meaning of 
that phrase. . 
C. The Original Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
The conception of natural rights as liberty rights that may some-
times be regulated but not abolished was not abandoned after the 
founding period. It was held, perhaps even to a greater degree, by the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. RecallJohn Page's reference 
to "privilege" in his discussion of the right of peaceable assembly that 
became part of the First Amendment.78 The terms "rights," "liberties," 
"privileges," and "immunities" were often used interchangeably or in a 
cluster. This terminology is reflected in what is known as the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in the 
wake of the Civil War: "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States .... "79 
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and to prevent future Con-
gresses from reneging on its guarantees.80 The bill provided federal 
protections against infringement by state governments of the rights 
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property."81 
77 Id. at 352 ("For in the State of Nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent 
Delights, a Man has two Powers."). 
78 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
80 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71-91 (1986) (outlining the congressional debates on 
the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
81 See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
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As Michael Kent Curtis has shown, "privileges or immunities" was 
a common way of referring to "civil rights," which included the legally 
protected rights one received in return for surrendering to the gov-
ernment the natural right, or "executive power," to enforce one's own 
rights. 
Both in his prototype and in his final version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, [Senator John A.] Bingham used the words privileges 
and immunities as a shorthand description of fundamental or consti-
tutional rights. Use of the words in this way had a long and distin-
guished heritage. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
published in the colonies on the eve of the Revolution, had divided 
the rights and liberties of Englishmen into those "immunities" that 
were the residuum of natural liberties and those ''privileges'' that society had 
provided in lieu of natural rights. 82 
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect 
natural rights-or even civil rights-why did they use the term "privi-
leges or immunities" instead? The short answer is that they did so 
because, while "privileges or immunities" include natural rights, it is a 
broader phrase that includes additional rights. 
To appreciate this, we must begin by considering what was then a 
controversial interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the original 
Constitution: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."83 From the 
earliest days of the United States some argued that this provision re-
ferred to the fundamental or natural rights that belonged to every 
citizen of the United States. That this was truly the original meaning 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV has been con-
tested.84 It is not seriously disputed, however, that some time after 
ratification it came to be widely insisted by some judges, scholars, and 
opponents of slavery that Article IV was indeed a reference to natural 
rights. Nor is it disputed that, whenever it first developed, the mem-
bers of the Thirty-Ninth Congress meant to import this meaning into 
82 CURTIS, supra note 80, at 64 (emphasis added). 
83 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
84 Compare Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1 passim (1967) 
(contending that the clause referred to natural rights), with David S. Bogen, The Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article Iv, 37 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 794, 796 (1987) (argu-
ing that the clause was "not a reference to natural law, but was solely concerned with 
creating a national citizenship"). In accord with Antieau is Michael Conant, An-
timonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases 
Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785,817 (1982). 
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the text of the Constitution by using the language of "privileges" and 
"immunities" in the Fourteenth Amendment.85 
The antebellum argument that privileges and immunities in-
cluded natural rights was made famously in 1823 by Justice Bushrod 
Washington, while sitting as a circuit court trial judge in the case of 
Carfield v. Coryell.86 Because this language was so often repeated by 
those seeking to find federal protection of fundamental rights, espe-
cially by members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, I present it in full: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expres-
sions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, 
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free 'gov-
ernments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens 
of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of 
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fun-
damental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than dif-
ficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended 
under the following general heads: Protection by the government; 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may 
justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a 
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, 
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute 
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, 
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an ex-
emption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the 
other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particu-
lar privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced 
by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: 
to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and es-
tablished by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be 
exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, 
85 This is conceded even by those who deny that the original meaning of "privi-
leges and immunities" in Article IV was a reference to natural rights. See Bogen, 
supra note 84, at 843: 
This array of arguments [that the clause referred to natural rights] proved 
persuasive to a generation confronted with the moral breakdown of society 
represented by slavery. Slavery was constitutional, but contrary to funda-
mental principles of natural law. The symbolic honor and integrity of the 
Constitution could be saved by identitying it with fundamental rights. This 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment attempted to do in the privileges 
and immunities clause of that amendment. 
86 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 3230). 
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strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of 
them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was mani-
festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the cor-
responding provision in the old articles of confederation) "the 
better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different states of the Union."87 
459 
While this passage includes reference to what were considered 
natural or inherent liberty rights, "privileges and immunities" here 
unquestionably refers also to such positive civil rights as the "protec-
tion of government" that one receives in exchange for surrendering 
one's power of enforcement. As employed by Justice Washington, it is 
a broader term that also includes other fundamental rights created by 
state and federal constitutions, such as "the elective franchise, as regu-
lated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which 
it is to be exercised."88 
Chester Antieau observed that "it would be almost impossible to 
overestimate the importance of the above quotation upon American 
law."89 Of greatest relevance, Carfield was repeatedly cited by some 
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress as constitutional justification 
for their passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided in sec-
tion 1 that 
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of slavery ... shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens ... yo 
Most, if not all, of the rights on this list are unenumerated liberty 
rights of the sort accepted at the Founding. 
Senator Lyman Trumbell, a former justice of the Illinois Supreme 
Court, was the principal draftsman of both the Thirteenth Amend-
ment prohibiting involuntary servitude and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he took the 
floor of the Senate to argue that Congress had the authority to pass 
the Civil Rights Act under, among other provisions, the Privileges and 
87 Id. at 551-52. 
88 Whether the right to vote was among the privileges or immunities protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment later became a matter of some controversy. But there is 
little doubt that the right to a jury trial, though not a natural right, was considered a 
privilege or immunity of citizenship by the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
89 Antieau, supra note 84, at 12. 
90 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
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Immunities Clause of Article IV: "What rights are secured to the citi-
zens of each State under that provision? Such fundamental rights as 
belong to every free person."91 To establish this interpretation, he 
cited several judicial opinions and then offered, in its entirety, the 
quotation from Washington's opinion in Corfield that appears above.92 
In another speech advocating the override of President Johnson's 
veto of the Civil Rights Act, Trumbell posed the question, "[w]hat 
rights do citizens of the United States have?" He answered, "They are 
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or 
free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, 
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union."93 As exam-
ples of "natural rights" and "inalienable rights" he offered these: 
"'The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the 
right to acquire and enjoy property."'94 
Along the same lines was the speech by Representative James F. 
Wilson of Iowa, who was coauthor of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the House, and chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee. Wilson argued that "civil rights are the 
natural rights of man; and these are the rights which this bill proposes 
to protect every citizen in the enjoyment of throughout the entire do-
minion of the Republic."95 Mter elaborating at length on these rights, 
he concluded, "Before our Constitution was formed, the great funda-
mental rights which I have mentioned, belonged to every person who 
became a member of our great national family. No one surrendered a 
jot or tittle of these rights by consenting to the formation of the Gov-
ernment."96 Without "the power ... to secure these rights which ex-
isted anterior to the ordination of the Constitution," the government 
would be "a failure in its most important office."97 
Mter the Civil Rights Bill was vetoed by President Johnson on the 
ground that it exceeded the constitutional powers of Congress, Repre-
sentative William Lawrence, Republican of Ohio and a former state 
court judge, rose to advocate overriding that veto. Mter a lengthy ex-
amination of the authorities on behalf of the proposition that 
"[1] egislative powers exist in our system to protect, not to destroy, the 
inalienable rights of men,"98 Lawrence noted that" [i] t has never been 
91 CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
92 Id. at 475. 
93 Id. at 1757. 
94 Id. (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *1). 
95 Id. at 1117. 
96 Id. at 1119. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1832-33. 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 461 2003-2004
PROPER SCOPE OF POLICE POWER 
deemed necessary to enact in any constitution or law that citizens 
should have the right to life or liberty or the right to acquire property. 
These rights are recognized by the Constitution as existing anterior to 
and independently of all laws and all constitutions."99 He concluded: 
"Without further authority I may assume, then, that there are certain 
absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and 
of which a State cannot constitutionally deprive him."1Oo 
Lawrence also cited with approval Justice Washington's opinion 
in Corfield, while elaborating that though" [t] he Constitution does not 
define what these privileges and immunities" in Article IV are, they 
"are of two kinds, to wit, those which I have shown to be inherent in 
every citizen of the United States, and such others as may be con-
ferred by local law and pertain only to the citizen of the State."101 
This statement by Representative Lawrence confirms that "privileges 
or immunities" was a reference both to inherent or natural rights and 
to various rights or privileges created by the positive law of particular 
governments. 
As important to understanding the original meaning of the term 
"privileges or immunities" were the explanations later offered by 
members of Congress when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Mter reading the same quotation from Justice Washington's opinion 
in Corfield, Senator Jacob Howard, Republican and former Attorney 
General of Michigan, stated: "Such is the character of the privileges 
and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article 
of the Constitution."102 He then continued: "To these privileges and 
immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be 
fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these 
should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the 
first eight amendments of the Constitution."103 
Mter listing these rights,104 Howard noted the fact that courts 
had rejected the abolitionist argument that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV protected the rights of citizens from m-
fringement by state governments. 
[Ilt is a fact well worthy of attention that the course of decision of 
our courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immuni-
ties, privileges, rights, thus guarantied by the Constitution or recog-
nized by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United 
99 Id. at 1833. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1836. 
102 Id. at 2765. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (including the "personal" right "to keep and to bear arms"). 
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States and as a party in their courts. They do not operate in the 
slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation. 
States are not affected by them . . . .105 
Thus the need for the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and 
to carry out any of these guarantees ... but they stand simply as a 
bill of rights in the Constitution, without power on the part of Con-
gress to give them full effect; while at the same time the States are 
not restrained from violating the principles embraced in them ex-
cept by their own local constitutions, which may be altered from 
year to year. The great object of the first section of this amendment is, 
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to 
respect these great fundamental guarantees. 106 
The same sentiment was expressed by Congressman Frederick 
Woodbridge, Republican of Vermont. The "object of the proposed 
amendment," he said, was to give "the power to Coagress to enact 
those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the natural 
rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship," or, in other words, "those 
privileges and immunities which are guaranteed to him under the 
Constitution of the United States."107 That this represented a substan-
tial change in the relationship between state and federal governments 
is difficult to overemphasize. 
Those who seek to diminish the significance of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause have argued that, because it was enacted to consti-
tutionalize the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the amendment only protects 
against discrimination among the citizens of a state, the way the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination against out-of-
staters. The amendment does not say this, however, and there is little 
if any evidence its original meaning was so limited. Instead it adopts 
language that prohibits states from abridging the privileges or immu-
nities of some of its citizens or all of its citizens. In this way the clause 
protects rights both from discriminatory laws, as well as from laws that 
violate rights "absolutely" or across the board. 
Still, the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 is relevant to confirming the 
substance of privileges or immunities. For, notwithstanding that the 
bill sought to protect blacks by holding states to the protection af-
forded the rights of whites, the fact remains that most of the "privi-
leges or immunities" protected by this statute were natural liberty 
105 [d. 
106 [d. at 2765-66 (emphasis added). 
107 [d. at 1088 (emphasis added). 
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rights. Those who try to limit the Fourteenth Amendment to the very 
different words of the Civil Rights Bill are wrong. And they typically 
fail to see how the proper connection of the Civil Rights Bill to the 
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the crabbed interpretation of 
these privileges or immunities that was adopted by the Supreme Court 
within five years of its enactment over the ringing dissents of four 
Justices. 
I have seen little in the historical record to suggest exactly how 
the rights "retained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amend-
ment compared with the "privileges or immunities" protected by the 
Fourteenth. The natural implication is that because both phrases orig-
inally referred to background, natural, or inherent rights, both provi-
sions refer to the same set of unenumerable rights, though they differ 
on the jurisdiction created for the protection of these rights. Just as 
the Fourteenth Amendment extended protection of the enumerated 
rights of the first eight amendments to violations by state govern-
ments, so too' did it extend federal protection of the preexisting 
unenumerated rights "retained by the people." The quotations from 
Justice Washington and others suggest that "privileges or immunities" 
is a broader term including both natural or inherent rights as well as 
those particular "positive" procedural rights created by the Bill of 
Rights. 
This was the view held by Ohio Senator John Sherman, a Republi-
can member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress and future Secretary of 
State who, some years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, pointed to the Ninth Amendment as evidencing the existence 
of "other rights beyond those recognized"J08 in the Bill of Rights. 
Speaking to the Senate in 1872 in support of a civil rights bill to guar-
antee blacks and other citizens equal access to public accommoda-
tions-rights nowhere mentioned in the Constitution-Sherman 
contended: 
[T] he ordinary rights of citizenship, which no law has ever at-
tempted to define exactly, the privileges, immunities, and rights, 
(because I do not distinguish between them, and cannot do it), of 
citizens of the United States, such as are recognized by the common 
law, such as are ingrafted in the great charters of England, some of 
them in the constitutions of different States, and some of them in 
the Declaration of Independence, our fathers did not attempt to 
enumerate. They expressly said in the ninth amendment that they 
would not attempt to enumerate these rights; they were innumera-
108 CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 26 (1872) (statement of Sen. John 
Sherman). 
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ble, depending upon the laws and the courts as from time to time 
administered.109 
Sherman conceded that" [t]here may be sometimes great dispute 
and doubt as to what is the right, immunity, or privilege conferred 
upon a citizen of the United States."110 Nevertheless, the task of iden-
tifYing that right must fall "from time to time [to] the judicial tribu-
nals."lll To determine these rights, immunities, or privileges, judges 
will look first at the Constitution of the United States as the primary 
fountain of authority. If that does not define the right they will look 
for the unenumerated powers to the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence, to every scrap of American history, to the history of En-
gland, to the common law of England, the old decisions of Lords 
Mansfield and Holt, and so on back to the earliest recorded deci-
sions of the common law. There they will find the fountain and 
reservoir of the rights of American as well as English citizens.112 
Sherman advocated his expansive, perhaps overly expansive, 
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1872. Little did he 
know that this flywheel of the Fourteenth Amendment was about to be 
excised and the amendment redacted by a bare majority of the Su-
preme Court. 
III. THE DEMISE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
When the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
considered by the Supreme Court, its original meaning was set aside 
109 Id. at 844 (statement of Sen. John Sherman). 
110 Id. 
III Id. 
112 Id. Senator Allen Thurman, an Ohio Democrat and former member of the 
Ohio Supreme Court, agreed with Sherman that the retained rights referred to in the 
Ninth Amendment are held by the people 
against the Government of the United States by as good a title as they hold 
them against the world. They belong to them as people or as individuals. 
They have never surrendered them to any Government, and they do not 
hold them by the grace of any Government whatsoever; they hold them be-
cause they were and are their inherent natural rights which have never been 
surrendered. 
Id. app. at 26. Nevertheless, Thurman also contended that these are not rights the 
people hold "as citizens of the United States, but so to speak, in despite of the United 
States." Id. Thurman was also concerned with the indefiniteness of identifYing such 
extratextual rights. "Where are we to find a definition of them?" he asked. Id. "The 
Senator from Massachusetts finds the definition in the Declaration of Independence; 
another Senator finds it in something else; and so on to the end of the chapter; and 
we have nothing certain, nothing definite, nothing upon which any man can rely." 
Id. 
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by a five to four decision in what are called the Slaughter-House 
Cases. lI3 It is very useful to revisit the opinions in these cases, both to 
see the weakness of the majority's reasoning, and to examine carefully 
the theories set forth in three separate dissents. These much ne-
glected dissenting opinions tell us a great deal about how the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was supposed to work. And this, in turn, 
will help us discern the proper scope of the police powers of states. 
The Slaughter-House Cases arose when, in 1869, the legislature of 
Louisiana passed an act ordering all animals imported for consump-
tion in the city to be landed at certain places, and all intended for 
food to be slaughtered there. The same law also conferred on seven-
teen persons the exclusive right to maintain landings for cattle and to 
erect slaughterhouses, chartering them under the name of The Cres-
cent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. This 
law was challenged by the Live Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Associa-
tion, whose members would be prohibited from competing with the 
new monopoly. 
At the appellate court level, Supreme Court Justice Bradley, sit-
ting as a circuit court judge, 114 indicated sympathy for a constitutional 
challenge based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause (although he 
ruled that the federal courts did not have power to e~oin state pro-
ceedings initiated by the Crescent City Company). Bradley began by 
distinguishing the new Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from the old Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV.I15 The new provision "is not identical with the clause in 
the constitution which declared that 'the citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states.' It embraces much more."116 The "Privileges and Immunities" 
referred to in Article IV "were only such as each state gave to its own 
citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own 
citizens, and against the citizens of other states. "117 But the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits any 
state from abridging the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the 
United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely 
113 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
114 In those days before the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, Justices 
themselves "rode circuit" to hear appeals. 
115 In what follows, I use "Privileges or Immunities Clause," to refer to the clause in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. When I refer to "Privileges and Immunities Clause," I 
mean the clause that appears in Article IV. 
116 Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408). 
117 Id. 
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requires equality of privileges; but it demands that the privileges and 
immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, 
unim paired." I 18 
In other words, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV barred discrimination against out-of-staters, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred states both 
from discriminating among different citizens within a state and from 
abridging or impairing of the rights of all citizens even if the restric-
tions applied equally to all. Bradley then addressed the nature of 
these privileges a state cannot invade. "It may be difficult to enumer-
ate or define them," he began, 
[b]ut so far as relates to the question in hand, we may safely say it is 
one of the privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow 
such lawful industrial pursuit-not injurious to the community-as 
he may see fit, without unreasonable regulation or molestation, and 
without being restricted by any of those unjust, oppressive, and odi-
ous monopolies or exclusive privileges which have been condemned 
by all free governments .... 119 
According to Justice Bradley, this and other essential privileges 
cannot be invaded without sapping the very foundations of republi-
can government. A republican government is not merely a govern-
ment of the people, but it is a free government. Without being free, 
it is republican only in name, and not republican in truth, and any 
government which deprives its citizens of the right to engage in any 
lawful pursuit, subject only to reasonable restrictions, or at least sub-
ject only to such restrictions as are reasonably within the power of 
government to impose,-is tyrannical and unrepublican. And if to 
enforce arbitrary restrictions made for the benefit of a favored few, 
it takes away and destroys the citizen's property without trial or con-
demnation, it is guilty of violating all the fundamental privileges to 
which I have referred, and one of the fundamental principles of 
free government. 120 
When the various slaughterhouse cases finally made their way to 
the full Supreme Court, Bradley's approach was rejected by a vote of 
five to four. Writing for the majority, Justice Miller distinguished be-
tween the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which 
were created by the Constitution and protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the privileges and immunities or "civil rights" of 
state citizenship, which corresponded to what Justice Washington 
118 Id. 
119 !d. 
120 Id. 
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wrote in Corfield and were protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
clause of Article IV.121 The latter "are those which belong to citizens 
of the States as such, and ... they are left to the State governments for 
security and protection, and not by this article placed under the spe-
cial care of the Federal government .... "122 
In defense of this interpretation, Miller offered no direct evi-
dence from the statements of those who proposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Such proof would have been impossible. Instead, he ig-
nored the original meaning of the clause to rest his conclusion on the 
consequences of holding otherwise. If the "privileges or immunities" 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were as broad as the cate-
gory of "civil rights," he contended, then 
not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress when-
ever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by 
State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limit-
ing and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in 
their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may 
think proper on all such subjects. 123 
This, argued Miller, would be to give Congress a national police 
power that would supersede the traditional powers of the states in 
every area of legislation and would "radically change [ ] the whole the-
ory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each 
other and of both these governments to the people."124 "[I] n the ab-
sence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit 
of doubt,"125 Miller concluded that "no such results were intended by 
the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legisla-
tures of the States which ratified them."126 Because the privilege to 
pursue one's trade or occupation was a "civil right" and not a privilege 
of national citizenship it was, therefore, unprotected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
What then, according to Justice Miller, were the privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship protected by the amendment? He 
declined to elaborate since it was clear to him that the right asserted 
by the claimants was not among them. But he did list a few "which 
owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, 
its Constitution, or its laws."127 A citizen has the right 
121 
122 
123 
124 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.s. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872). 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 79. 
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to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have 
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, 
to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering 
its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through 
which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the 
subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several 
States .... 
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand 
the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, 
liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign government .... The right to peaceably assemble 
and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of 
habeas carpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United 
States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several 
States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign na-
tions, are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not 
citizenship of a State. 128 
The dissenting justices, in separate opinions, took strong issue 
with Miller's imputation of intent to Congress. On the majority's in-
terpretation, wrote Justice Field, "it was a vain and idle enactment, 
which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Con-
gress and the people on its passage .... But if the amendment refers 
to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the 
inhibition has a profound significance and consequence."129 What, 
then, did Field think were the privileges or immunities that were se-
cured against abridgment by state legislation? Field's answer rested 
importantly on evidence of original meaning. 
First, privileges or immunities included the civil rights protected 
by the Civil Rights Act: "the right 'to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property.' "130 He also referenced the list recited by Justice Washing-
ton in Corfield: 
Mr. Justice Washington said he had "no hesitation in confining 
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which were, in 
their nature, fundamental; which belong of right to citizens of all 
free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several States which compose the Union, from the 
128 Id. at 79-80 (quotation omitted). 
129 Id. at 96 (Field, j., dissenting). 
130 Id. (Field, j., dissenting). 
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time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign;" and, in 
considering what those fundamental privileges were, he said that 
perhaps it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate them, 
but that they might be "all comprehended under the following gen-
eral heads: protection by the government; the e~oyment of life and 
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, 
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, neverthe-
less, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for 
the general good of the whole."131 
To Justice Field, this appeared "to be a sound construction of the 
clause in question. The privileges and immunities designated are 
those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments. "132 Unlike 
Miller, Field referred to the congressional debates, noting that 
repeated reference was made to this language of Mr. Justice Wash-
ington. It was cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that 
it enumerated the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United 
States set forth in the first section of the act, and with the statement 
that all persons born in the United States, being declared by the act 
citizens of the United States, would thenceforth be entitled to the 
rights of citizens, and that these were the great fundamental rights 
set forth in the act; and that they were set forth "as appertaining to 
every freeman."133 
In essence, the maJority found there to be two classes of privileges 
and immunities: national and state. The national ones were those spe-
cifically designated in the Constitution or directly derivable from its 
national character; the state ones were the full panoply of natural or 
"civil rights" that pertain to all free persons. The Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the former abso-
lutely, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
protects the latter by protecting citizens from discrimination when 
they are residing or acting in other states. In contrast, Justice Field 
contended that there was just one set of privileges and/or immunities 
that formerly had been unprotected from state infringement, but 
which had been given national protection by the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As between the two, the dissenters' position 
is clearly more consonant with the origins and original meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Like Justice Field's opinion, which discussed the original mean-
ing of "privileges or immunities," Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion 
elaborated the arguments he had made earlier while riding circuit 
131 [d. at 97 (Field, j., dissenting). 
132 [d. (Field, j., dissenting). 
133 [d. at 98 (Field, j., dissenting). 
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concerning the meaning of this phrase, and again quoted Justice 
Washington's opinion in Corfield. But Bradley also offered an impor-
tant theoretical rebuttal to Justice Miller's contention that equating 
"privileges or immunities" with civil rights would be to establish a 
broad national power that would supersede those of the states. 
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubt-
edly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted. 
But there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regula-
tion cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise, 
but it cannot subvert the rights themselves. 134 
In this neglected passage, Justice Bradley made a crucial distinc-
tion I mentioned above: the distinction between regulating the exer-
cise of a civil right and improperly subverting or abridging its exercise; 
or between "regulating and facilitating" rightful conduct and "prohib-
iting or discouraging" it. States were free to regulate civil rights-that 
is, specifY "the manner of their exercise"-and Congress was not em-
powered by the Fourteenth Amendment to do so. What the amend-
ment did was to give the national government jurisdiction to protect 
these civil rights from being improperly abridged or subverted in the 
name of the "right of regulation." In the last portion of his dissent, 
Justice Bradley examined whether the monopoly at issue in the 
Slaughter-House Cases was a reasonable regulation and concluded that 
it was not. 
Justice Bradley also offered a useful distinction between the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause and its Due Pro-
cess Clause. Among the most fundamental privileges or immunities 
protected by both provisions were those described by Blackstone as 
that of life, liberty, and property, and by the Declaration of Indepen-
dence as that of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
These are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by 
due process of law, and which can only be interfered with, or the 
enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations neces-
sary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend, 
belong to the citizens of every free government. I35 
The function of the Due Process Clause can be seen as prohibit-
ing a state from depriving particular individuals, whether citizens or 
not, of their life, liberty, or property ("Nor shall the state deprive any 
person . .. ").136 The function of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
to protect the citizenry as a whole against unnecessary or improper 
134 /d. at 114 (Bradley, j., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
135 Id. at 116 (Bradley, j., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
136 U.S. CaNST. amend. XN, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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legislation that infringes upon the exercise of their civil rights or lib-
erty ("No state shall make or enforce any law . .. ") .137 In other words, 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, one 
cannot have his or her rights taken away without due process of law. 
And under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Bradley would 
require that legislation that purported to "regulate" or modify the ex-
ercise of any civil right-including that to life, liberty, and property-
be both necessary and proper for the common good. 
In this way,Justice Bradley resolved an obvious and long-standing 
tension between the two provisions. If the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is read to protect the rights found in the Bill of Rights, how is it 
that states may not abridge such rights as the right peaceably to assem-
ble, but may abridge what appears to be the even more fundamental 
rights to life, liberty, and property on condition only that "due pro-
cess" is provided? The answer is (l) that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause includes the rights of life, liberty, and property in addition to 
those listed in the Bill of Rights, and (2) that legislation that improp-
erly "abridges"-rather than regulates-the entire set of civil rights is 
prohibited, whereas even a proper lawl38 may not be used to deprive 
any particular person of her life, liberty, or property unless she is ac-
corded due process. Whereas the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protects a broad set of rights-including life, liberty, and property-
of all citizens from improper laws, the Due Process Clause protects the 
life, liberty, or property of all persons from an improper application of 
an otherwise proper law.139 
Bradley also responded to Justice Miller's claim that providing 
federal protection of fundamental civil rights would bring into federal 
courts the full panoply of cases now decided by state courts. "As the 
privileges and immunities protected are only those fundamental ones 
which belong to every citizen, they would soon become so far defined 
as to cause but a slight accumulation of business in the Federal courts. 
Besides, the recognized existence of the law would prevent its fre-
quent violation."14o By placing so much weight on consequences, the 
137 ld. (emphasis added). 
138 A proper law is one that either regulates rightful or prohibits wrongful 
behavior. 
139 Because citizens may have more privileges than aliens, a law may treat them 
differently and still be proper under the Privileges or Immunities Clause-though 
citizens from other states are protected against discrimination within a state by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Nevertheless, all persons, whether or 
not they are citizens, have a right under the Due Process Clause to have otherwise 
proper laws applied to them with due process. 
140 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 124 (Bradley,]., dissenting) 
o 
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majority was, thought Bradley, putting the cart before the horse. "The 
great question is, What is the true construction of the amendment? 
When once we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. 
The argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very control-
ling influence in questions of this sort."141 
Justice Miller's majority opinion has long been thought to have 
gutted the Privileges or Immunities clause of any real significance 
and, indeed, after Slaughter-House it ceased to play any important func-
tion. On the other hand, as has been pointed out by Kevin Newsom, 
Miller's opinion can be interpreted (though it has not been) as adopt-
ing the middle ground of protecting all the rights explicitly protected 
in the Constitution-including the Bill of Rights-but not the "civil 
rights" that are unmentioned there. 142 The majority opinion's refer-
ence to the right in the First Amendment to peaceably assemble as a 
protected privilege or immunity of national citizenship supports New-
som's interpretation of the case. If Newsom is right, then the butchers 
lost because the right they asserted was not among those that were 
enumerated in the Constitutibn. 
While a significant advance over the prevailing view of Slaughter-
House, even this more expansive interpretation of Miller's opinion 
conflicts with the original meaning of "privileges or immunities." As 
we have seen, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its sup-
porters in Congress, spoke often of protecting the Bill of Rights from 
infringement by states, but they clearly did not limit the meaning of 
this clause to these rights. They repeatedly referred to Justice Wash-
ington's expansive list of rights in Corfield, to the concept ofnqtural or 
"civil" rights, in addition to the privileges contained in the Bill of 
Rights. Among these additional privileges or immunities rights were 
the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. And they made no 
distinction whatever between classes of state and national privileges or 
immunities. 
In his dissenting opinion, the third of the three dissents filed in 
the case, Justice Swayne made much the same originalist point: 
The construction adopted by the majority of my brethren is, in my 
judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not antici-
pated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and 
of those by whom itwas adopted. To the extent of that limitation it 
turns, as it were, what was meant for bread into a stone. By the 
Constitution, as it stood before the war, ample protection was given 
141 Id. (Bradley,]., dissenting). 
142 See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE LJ. 643, 706 (2000). 
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against oppression by the Union, but little was given against wrong 
and oppression by the States. That want was intended to be supplied 
by this amendment. Against the former this court has been called 
upon more than once to interpose. Authority of the same ampli-
tude was intended to be conferred as to the latter. But this arm of 
our jurisdiction is, in these cases, stricken down by the judgment 
just given. Nowhere, than in this court, ought the will of the nation, 
as thus expressed, to be more liberally construed or more cordially 
executed. This determination of the majority seems to me to lie far 
in the other direction. 143 
473 
Swayne concluded by expressing his earnest "hope that the conse-
quences to follow may prove less serious and far-reaching than the 
minority fear they will be."144 
The Fourteenth Amendment was born of a newfound distrust of 
state governments. The immediate cause of this distrust was, of 
course, the imposition of chattel slavery by state governments in the 
. South before the war and the resistance to reconstruction afterward. 
But while it was instigated by the experience of reconstruction, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to apply only to former 
slaves. Indeed, among the core of its concerns was the protection of 
free speech, peaceable assembly, and the right to keep and bear arms 
by white, as well as black, supporters of Reconstruction.145 Both 
before and after the Civil War, the civil liberties of white unionists and 
abolitionists were severely restricted in the South, much to the dismay 
of Northern Republicans.146 
Moreover, the principles that were advanced against slavery ap-
plied to whites in another way. Abolitionists had developed a princi-
ple known as "free labor."147 The right to one's labor was one's own, 
they argued, and could be alienated only by consent. Even when a 
contract to work for another was made, such contracts could not be 
143 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne,j., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 130 (Swayne, j., dissenting). 
145 See generally CURTIS, supra note 80. 
146 See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition 
Mob: Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 
UClA L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1997) (discussing how states in the South abridged the 
First Amendment rights of abolitionists). 
147 For the history of the American tradition of free labor, see generally ERIC 
FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REpUBLICAN PARTY 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); ROBERT j. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: 
THE EMPLOYMENT RElATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAw AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 
(1991). 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 474 2003-2004
474 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
specifically or coercively enforced. 148 As was explained In the 1865 
case of Ford v. Jermon, 
[i]s it not obvious that a contract for personal services thus enforced 
would be but a mitigated form of slavery, in which the party would 
have lost the right to dispose of himself as a free agent, and be, for a 
greater or less length of time, subject to the control of another?149 
Like the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited involuntary 
servitude, the free labor principle protected whites as well as blacks. 
Although the facts in Slaughter-House did not concern Mrican slavery 
or its vestiges, the dissent nonetheless understood the liberty to pur-
sue an occupation to be a fundamental right closely related to "free 
labor." The monopoly granted by Louisiana, they argued, directly 
abridged the right to pursue the lawful occupation of butcher by de-
priving butchers of the requisite of maintaining a slaughterhouse. 
Soon after its adoption, then, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
invoked by citizens seeking protection of their liberties from improper 
restrictions by states that were not (apparently) motivated by racial 
discrimination. While the decision in Slaughter-House effectively fore-
closed using the Privileges or Immunities Clause for this purpose, the 
theories advanced by the four dissenters were later shifted to the Due 
Process Clause and, for a time, came to prevail. 
Alth01.~gh the Privileges or Immunities Clause was largely gutted 
by the conventional interpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases,150 
there are signs that it is not yet a dead letter. I 51 Moreover, after 
Slaughter-House, the courts began using the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses to provide much the same constraint on state 
power that was originally intended to result from the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, albeit with less textual justification. The "absolute" 
protection against laws that violate the privileges or immunities of all 
citizens has been shifted to the Due Process Clause, although not to 
the degree warranted by the original meaning of the Privileges or Im-
148 See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding 
Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE LJ. 775, 795-99 (1992) (describing 
how the free labor concept affected early judicial stances towards specific penonn-
ance of labor contracts). 
149 Ford v.Jennon, 6 Phila. 6, 7 (1865). The suit concerned the specific penonn-
ance of an actor. Plaintiff Ford was also the owner of the theater in which Lincoln was 
murdered. 
150 Though this interpretation may have exaggerated the degree to which the ma-
jority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases undercut the application of the Bill of 
Rights to the states. See Newsom, supra note 142, at 666. 
151 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (grounding the unenumerated 
right to travel in the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
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munities Clause. Likewise, the protection against laws that discrimi-
nated against a particular class of citizens was shifted to the Equal 
Protection Clause, the original purpose of which was to require the 
state judiciary and executive branch officials equally to apply and en-
force necessary and proper laws. 
IV. CONSTRUING WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SAY: THE 
POLICE POWER OF THE STATES 
With the meaning of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments in 
hand, we are in a position finally to consider the proper scope of state 
power. Our task is to define the scope of the power left in the hands 
of state government that is consistent with the above conception of 
the liberty rights "retained by the people" as well as the "privileges or 
immunities" of citizens. Given that no provision of the written Consti-
tution specifies the power of states over their citizens, any such doc-
trine of state power must be a constitutional construction-but one 
that is consistent with the equal protection of liberty rights, privileges 
or immunities retained by the people explicitly protected by the text. 
Strictly speaking we are not seeking a doctrine of what powers are 
delegated to states under the Constitution. We are seeking a doctrine 
to identify those powers that the people of the states may, if they 
choose, delegate to their state governments by means of their state 
constitutions without violating the Constitution of the United States. Any 
assessment of the power held by a particular state must begin by exam-
ining its constitution. In this Article, I am considering only the 
proper scope or limits of the powers that may, but need not be, dele-
gated to a particular state government by its constitution. 
The most obvious power of states that follows from the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the power to pro-
hibit any violations by some citizens of the liberties or rights of other 
citizens. In addition to the power of prohibiting wrongful conduct, the 
power of states may also properly include the power of regulating right-
ful behavior. It is no coincidence, then, that this very conception of 
state power came to be advocated by courts and commentators seek-
ing to respect and protect the background rights of the people. This 
power was called the power of police or the "police power" of the 
states. It is notorious for being difficult to define and limit.152 
152 See, e.g., 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw: SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 213 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890) ("I can find 
no satisfactory definition of this phrase, 'police power,' in the decisions of the Su-
preme Court itself."); Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Powm, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 
322, 322 (1907) ("No phrase is more frequently used and at the same time less under-
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A. Origins of the Doctrine of the "Police" Power 
Because the police power of states was not included in the text of 
the original Constitution, we are not bound by what the Founders may 
have thought this concept entailed. Nevertheless, examining the few 
instances where it was discussed reveals that it referred originally to 
those powers not delegated to the federal government. The phrase 
"internal police" was used seven times by delegates to refer to the 
power of state governments; once this power was referred to as "their 
police."153 The issue of the police power of states arose when the Con-
vention was still considering making a general grant of power to the 
national government, but wished to ensure that the "[National Legis-
lature should] not ... interfere with the government of the individual 
States in any matters of internal police ... wherein the general welfare 
of the United States is not concerned."154 In The Federalist, Hamilton 
employed the term "domestic police" twice in essays denying that the 
national government was a threat to state power. 155 
The term "police" was rarely used in the state ratification conven-
tions. On two occasions in New York it was used to refer to the power 
of states. John Williams insisted that "[t]he constitution should be so 
formed as not to swallow up the state governments: the general gov-
ernment ought to be confined to certain national objects; and the 
states should retain such powers as concern their own internal po-
lice."156 Hamilton contended that there might be more force in this 
type of objection, 
[w]ere the laws of the Union to new-model the internal police of 
any state; were they to alter, or abrogate at a blow, the whole of its 
stood than the one which forms the subject of the present discussion."); Collins 
Denny, Jr., The Growth and Development of the Police Power of the State, 20 MICH. L. REv. 
173, 173 (1921) ("The police power of the state is one of the most difficult phases of 
our law to understand, and it is even more difficult to define it and to place it within 
any bounds."). 
153 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 165 (Max Farrand 
ed., 3d ed. 1966) (statement of Mr. Williamson, June 8, 1787); 2 id. at 21 Qournalof 
the Convention,July 17, 1787); 2 id. at 25 (statement ofMr. Sherman, July 17, 1787); 
2 id. at 26 (statement of Mr. Morris, July 17, 1787); 2 id. at 367 (statement of Mr. 
Rutledge, Aug. 22, 1787); 2 id. at 629 (statement of Mr. Sherman, Sept. 15, 1787); 2 
. id. at 630 (statement of Mr. Sherman, Sept. 15, 1787). 
154 2 id. at 21 (quoting from a resolution proposed to the convention). 
155 See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 12, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The 
regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender 
allurements to ambition."); THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 12, at 209 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (referring to "expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to 
the mere domestic police of a state"). 
156 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 43, at 24l. 
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civil and criminal institutions; were they to penetrate the recesses of 
domestic life, and control, in all respects, the private conduct of 
individuals. 157 
477 
Elsewhere, the term was used during the debate over the powers of 
Congress to control the national capital. In Pennsylvania, it was pro-
posed that the Constitution be amended so that the powers of Con-
gress "be qualified by a proviso that such right of legislation extend 
only to such regulations as respect the police and good order 
thereof."!58 The term "police" was also used in the same manner sev-
eral times in the Virginia convention.!59 
Only slight elaboration is added by St. George Tucker in his trea-
tise on the Constitution: 
The congress of the United States possesses no power to regulate, or 
interfere with the domestic concerns, or police of any state: it be-
longs not to them to establish any rules respecting the rights of 
property; nor will the constitution permit any prohibition of arms to 
the people; or of peaceable assemblies by them, for any purposes 
whatsoever, and in any number, whenever they may see occasion.I60 
In none of these uses, however, is the scope of this power made clear. 
What, then, did it mean? 
In one sense, the term is almost completely open-ended. Samuel 
Johnson defined "police" as "[t]he regulation and government of a 
city or country, so far as regards the inhabitants."!6! Apart from rein-
forcing the distinction between "regulate" ancl. "govern" that I have 
examined elsewhere,!62 this definition adds only the idea that the po-
lice power is a power over individuals (as opposed to a power over 
subsidiary governmental units). It adds little to our understanding 
the proper scope of the power to regulate and govern individuals. 
The same can be said about the early Supreme Court opinions by 
157 2 id. at 267-68. 
158 2 id. at 545. 
159 See e.g., 3 id. at 432 (statement of Mr. Mason, June 16, 1788); 3 id. at 434 
(statement of Mr. Grayson,June 16, 1788). 
160 Tucker, supra note 33, at 315-16. Notice Tucker's statement that the right to 
arms forbids disarming people, that this is an equivalent to the individual right of 
assembly, and note also his use of the term "prohibition" to denote what the right to 
keep and bear arms bars. 
161 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DlcrlONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. 
Strahan 1755). 
162 See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 
55 ARK. L..REv. 847, 863-65 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101, 139-43 (2001). 
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John Marshall distinguishing the "regulations of interstate commerce" 
from "police power regulations."163 
As Laurence Tribe has noted, "these labels appear to have been 
largely conclusory; whatever their internal coherence or their predic-
tive value for those who used them, they reveal little of the analysis 
underlying the decisions in which they played a role."164 
As a doctrine, the police power is of recent vintage. As one influ-
ential commentator wrote in 1900: 
The Police Power is a well recognized if not yet fully defined depart-
ment of constitutional law. It is also the newest one of anything 
near equal importance. The 1898 edition of Bouvier's Law Diction-
ary says that the law on this subject is all of recent growth, and most 
of it is in the last half of the nineteenth century. It could not con-
sistently say otherwise. The work as originally published in 1839 did 
not define the phrase "Police Power" nor even contain it. The thir-
teenth edition in 1867 did not have it. It was only in 1883 that this 
standard dictionary of law first explained the phrase. The volumi-
nous United States Digest did not include the phrase, either in its 
original edition or in its revision in 1873, among its separate head-
ings, nor among its subdivisions of constitutional law. It was not 
until 1879 that it began to appear among the subdivisions of consti-
tutional law in the annual supplements of that work. 165 
The original meaning of the police power is notoriously hard to 
define, for good reason. As this evidence shows, until the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it was simply that power contained in state constitutions, 
which did not conflict with the powers delegated to the United States 
or prohibited by it to the states. Its scope was therefore a matter of 
textual interpretation and construction by state courts. Because of the 
Supremacy Clause, federal courts did not need to examine the scope 
of the poliee power as, whatever its scope, it was simply trumped by 
any express prohibition or inconsistent delegated federal power. 
Therefore, until passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there simply 
was no reason to develop what might be called a "positive theory" of 
the police power that could trump even state constitutions. Such a 
theory immediately became necessary, however, once the Constitution 
was amended to give the national government the power to protect 
the privileges or immunities of citizens from infringements by their 
own state governments. And such a theory was swiftly produced. 
163 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,209-10 (1824). 
164 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1047 (3d ed. 2000). 
165 W.G. Hastings, The Development oj Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the 
Police Power oJthe State, 39 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'y 359,359-60 (1900). Hastings's analy-
sis was widely cited and relied upon by other works on the subject. 
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B. The Lockean Theory of the Police Power 
In 1868, the same year the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, 
the first edition of Thomas M. Cooley's A Treatise on the Constitutional 
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the Ameri-
can Union was published. 166 Cooley, then a justice on the Michigan 
Supreme Court and the Jay Professor of Law at the University of Mich-
igan, sought to address the question of "conflict between national and 
State authority" as well as the question of "whether the State exceeds 
its just powers in dealing with the property and restraining the actions 
ofindividuals."167 The answers to these questions turned on the con-
tent of the police power, which he defined in light of previous judicial 
opinions as follows: 
The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its system 
of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to preserve the 
public order and to prevent offences against the State, but also to 
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of 
good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to pre-
vent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted 
enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like 
enjoyment of rights by others.168 
The last part of this definition can be conceptualized as the 
power of a state to protect the rights of each of its citizens from being 
violated by any other person in society and to permit the exercise of 
one's rights in such a manner as to prevent such exercise from intrud-
ing upon the like rights of others. Whereas the protection afforded 
common law rights by adjudication occurs after they have been vio-
lated, police power regulations seek to facilitate or "make regular" the 
exercise of these rights and prevent their infringement before the 
fact. 169 Whereas damage actions compensate for past violations of 
rights, the police power permits laws necessary to prevent rights viola-
tions from occurring. 
There is no enumeration or list of specific state powers for much 
the same reason the Founders thought rights could not be compre-
hensively listed. Just as all the ways that liberty may be exercised right-
166 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1866). 
167 Id. at 572. 
168 Id. 
169 I refer to "police power regulation" because, in Lockean theory, adjudication is 
also an exercise of police power. See infra notes 172-88 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 480 2003-2004
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
fully cannot be enumerated in advance, neither can all the specific 
ways that people may transgress upon the rights of others: 
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which 
this power is or may be exercised, because the various cases in which 
the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a simi-
lar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or 
safety, are infinite in number and in variety.170 
Like the modern doctrine that views content-neutral "time, place, 
and manner" regulations of speech to be consistent with the First 
Amendment, the police power provides the states with the authority 
"to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and 
circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or exer-
cise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those constitu-
tional principles which are established for the protection of private 
rights or private property."171 
Cooley's conception of the police power descended from the 
same Lockean natural rights theory on which the Ninth Amendment 
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause were based. In the prepoliti-
cal "state of nature," people are in possession of all their natural 
rights, including the right to execute or enforce their rights against 
other persons. "[lJn the state of Nature," wrote Locke, "every one has the 
Executive Power of the Law of Nature."172 However, in such a state, it 
can be objected that "it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their 
own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their 
Friends. And on the other side, that III Nature, Passion and Revenge 
will carry them too far in punishing others."173 For this reason, "noth-
ing but Confusion and Disorder will follow," and government IS 
needed "to restrain the partiality and violence of Men."174 
Locke readily conceded 
that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences 
of the State of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men 
may be Judges in their own Case, since 'tis easily to be imagined, 
that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce 
be so just as to condemn himself for it. 175 
For this reason, 
170 COOLEY, supra note 166, at 594. 
171 Id. at 597. 
172 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 275. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 275-76. 
175 Id. at 276. 
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the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, in-
different, and the same to all Parties; and by Men having Authority 
from the Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides all 
the differences that may happen between any Members of that Soci-
ety, concerning any matter of right; and punishes those Offences 
which any Member hath committed against the Society, with such 
Penalties as the Law has established. I76 
For Locke, an impartial judiciary applying a common law defines "civil 
society": 
Those who are united into one Body, and have a common estab-
lish'd Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide 
Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, are in Civil Soci-
ety one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal, I 
mean on Earth, are still in the state of Nature, each being, where 
there is no other, Judge for himself, and Executioner; which is, as I 
have before shew'd it, the perfect state of Nature. 1 77 
Thus, according to Lockean political theory, the first duty of gov-
ernment is to provide standing general rules for the equal protection 
of the rights retained by each person, and these rights, in turn, pro-
vide the baseline against which to assess the propriety of government 
actions and the justice of positive rules of law. But Locke also cau-
tioned those who saw government as the solution to the inconve-
niences of the state of nature that these inconveniences did not justify 
a Leviathan with unlimited power of the sort advocated by Hobbes: 
Absolute Monarchs are but Men, and if Government is to be the Rem-
edy of those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges 
in their own Cases, and the State of Nature is therefore not to be 
endured, I desire to know what kind of Government that is, and 
how much better it is than the State of Nature, where one Man, 
commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be Judge in his own 
Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases, without the 
least liberty to anyone to question or controle those who Execute 
his Pleasure? And in whatsoever he doth, whether led by Reason, 
Mistake or Passion, must be submitted to? 178 
From this, Locke concluded that the stat~ of nature with no gov-
ernment is preferable to an "absolute" or unlimited government, be-
cause at least in the state of nature, "Men are not bound to submit to 
the unjust will of another: And if he that judges, judges amiss in his 
176 Id. at 324. 
177 !d. 
178 !d. at 276. 
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own, or any other Case, he is answerable for it to the rest of 
Mankind." 179 
The propriety of the laws made by the legislature is dictated by 
the rationale for yielding the lawmaking power to the government. 
"Men, when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty, and 
Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the 
Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the 
Society shall require."180 This "good of society," however, is no open-
ended grant of power simply to do good; as was discussed above,181 it 
is defined and limited by the rights retained by the people when they 
surrender their powers of enforcement, and this is what makes it a 
genuine common good or good for everyone, not merely a segment 
or faction of society. 
[I]t being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve 
himself his Liberty and Property; (For no rational Creature can be 
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), 
the power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can 
never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good . . . .182 
And to secure this "common good," the legislature "is obliged to se-
cure every ones Property by providing against those three defects ... 
that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie."183 
These three defects are (I) the want of "an establish'd, setded, 
known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the Stan-
dard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide. all 
Controversies between them";184 (2) the want of "a known and indiffer-
ent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according to the 
established Law";185 and (3) the want of the "Power to back and sup-
port the Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution."186 
Therefore, 
whoever has the Legislative or Sup ream Power of any Common-
wealth, is bound to govern by establish'd standing Laws, promul-
gated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary Decrees; 
by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 371. 
181 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
182 LOCKE, supra note 61, at 371. 
183 Id. 
184 /d. at 369. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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those Laws; And to imploy the force of the Community at home, 
only in the Execution of such Laws. . . .187 
According to Lockean political theory, then, because people 
form government to secure their rights of liberty and property more 
effectively than they can secure them on their own, the executive or 
police power must be limited to the advancement of the common 
good, which is accomplished by protecting those same retained rights. 
In this way, Lockean theory provides both a powerful rationale for and 
an important limit upon the powers of government that is reflected in 
the police power doctrine. The police power is the legitimate author-
ity of states to regulate rightful and prohibit wrongful acts. 
The relationship between the exercise of inalienable natural lib-
erty rights and regulation was nicely described by Charles Bufford in 
1916, and is worth quoting at length: 
[I]f, in attempted exercise of inalienable rights, an individual 
should do with his own or conduct himself as he willed, without the 
internal restraint of conscience or the external restraint of law, 
others less able than himself to assert and defend their personal and 
property rights would, by reason of his unregulated assertion of his 
own personal and property rights, inevitably suffer an infringement 
of their equally inalienable rights. The common experience of 
mankind is that the restraints of conscience can not be relied upon 
in every case to restrain individuals from infringing the rights of 
others. Thus, that men may live together in society and e~oy some 
equality [in] their inalienable rights, it becomes necessary that each 
be subjected in the enjoyment of his own rights to at least some 
measure of regulation by legislation. 
In other words, the guaranty of individual freedom and individ-
ual property, of the right of the individual to do with his own and to 
conduct himself as he wills, can not be applied abstractly as though 
there were but one individual and he a law unto himself; but must 
be applied concretely in the light of the relationship of each indi-
vidual to others, and of the principle necessary to the friendly inter-
course of men with men as equals expressed in the maxim, sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas, "so use your own as not to injure 
another's." ... 
It thus appears that the inalienable rights of every one are sub-
ject to such regulation by legislation as tends to prevent him in the 
exercise of his own inalienable rights from unreasonably infringing 
187 !d. at 371. 
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upon those of others, and to secure to him the same uninterrupted 
enjoyment of his own inalienable rights as others enjoy.I88 
Unsurprisingly, the Lockean theory of the police power adopted 
by Cooley and others to identify when states violate the injunctions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is generally consistent with the concep-
tion of natural rights to which the framers of the Constitution and 
Fourteenth Amendment adhered. (And it would need to be so to 
avoid violating this amendment.) Natural rights define the boundary 
or space within which people are at liberty to do as they please, pro-
vided their actions do not interfere with the rightful actions of others 
operating within their own boundaries or spaces. Just as it is proper 
to prohibit wrongful or rights-violating conduct, proper police power 
regulations specifY the manner in which persons may exercise their 
liberties so as to prevent them from accidentally interfering with the 
rights of others. 
Cooley was not the only theorist to put flesh on the bones of this 
Lockean natural rights theory of police power. After Cooley, the lead-
ing nineteenth century theorist of the police power was Professor 
Christopher Tiedeman. In his 1886 A Treatise on the Limitations of Po-
lice Power in the United States Considered from both a Civil and Criminal 
Standpoint,189 he repeatedly relied on the power to prevent rights vio-
lations to identifY reasonable and therefore constitutional exercises of 
the police power. To explain the police power and its limits he began 
with the concept of natural rights: 
The private rights of the individual, apart from a few statutory 
rights, which when compared with the whole body of private rights 
are insignificant in number, do not rest upon the mandate of mu-
nicipal law as a source. They belong to man in a state of nature; 
they are natural rights, rights recognized and existing in the law of 
reason. 190 
Like Locke, Tiedeman defined the legitimate purpose of govern-
ment as the protection of these rights. "The object of government is 
to impose that degree of restraint upon human actions, which is nec-
essary to the uniform and reasonable conservation and enjoyment of 
private rights. Government and municipal law protect and develop, 
rather than create, private rights."191 Government protects and devel-
ops these rights by preventing people from violating the rights of 
188 Charles Bufford, The SCope and Meaning of Police Power, 4 CAL. L. REV. 269, 269, 
272 (1916). 
189 TIEDEMAN, supra note 1. 
190 Id. at 1. 
191 Id. 
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others. "The conservation of private rights is attained by the imposi-
tion of a wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as 
will prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of 
them .... The power of the government to impose this restraint is 
called POLICE POWER."192 
While the Lockean theory of the police power, as developed by 
Cooley, Tiedeman, and others, was generally consistent with the back-
ground rights retained by the people, this power was sometimes con-
strued more broadly than was proper. In particular, the police power 
was typically construed to empower states to protect not only the 
"health and safety" of the general public, but its "morals" as well. For 
example, in the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas, Justice Harlan rejected 
a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the prohibition of manufac-
turing and selling alcohol on the ground that "[iJt cannot be sup-
posed that the States intended, by adopting that Amendment, to 
impose restraints upon the exercise of their powers for the protection 
of the safety, health, or morals of the community."193 By this rationale, 
courts upheld the power of states to prohibit gambling, the consump-
tion of alcohol, prostitution, doing business on the Sabbath, and 
other types of activities that did not violate the rights of others. 
Some of these expansions were recognized by leading police 
power theorists as improper even at the time. Christopher Tiedeman, 
for example, contended that legislation prohibiting gambling "would 
be open to serious constitutional objections. Gambling or betting of 
any kind is a vice and not a trespass, and inasmuch as the parties are 
willing victims of the evil effects, there is nothing which calls for pub-
lic regulation."194 According to this view, "[nJo law can make vice a 
crime, unless it becomes by its consequence a trespass upon the rights 
of the public."195 For Tiedeman, the protection of rights is the mea-
sure of proper police power regulations. 
192 [d. at 1-2. 
193 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887) (emphasis added). In Mugler,Jus-
tice Harlan explained why judicial review was essential to cabin the police power: 
If ... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, 
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to 
those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the 
Constitution. 
ld. at 661. 
194 TIEDEMAN, supra note 1, at 260. 
195 [d. at 291. Tiedeman also thought that "when they pursue gambling as a busi-
ness, and set up a gambling house, like all others who make a trade of vice, they may 
be prohibited and subjected to severe penalties.» Id. at 260 (emphasis added). An 
explicit rationale for this distinction is not provided, but most likely it stems from 
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Tiedeman discusses at some length why temperance laws were 
not only bad policy, but also beyond the state's police power. "[N]o 
trade can be subjected to police regulation of any kind," wrote 
Tiedeman, "unless its prosecution involves some harm or injury to the 
public or to third persons, and in any case the regulation cannot ex-
tend beyond the evil which is to be restrained."196 Moreover, "no 
trade can be prohibited altogether, unless the evil is inherent in the 
character of the trade, so that the trade, however conducted, and 
whatever may be the character of the person engaged in it, must neces-
sarily produce injury upon the public or upon individual third 
persons. "197 
Mter a lengthy examination of the effects of the use and sale of 
alcohol, Tiedeman concluded that prohibition was not constitution-
ally justified under the principles of the police power. "[T] he liquor 
trade can not ... be prohibited entirely, unless its prosecution is es-
sentially and necessarily injurious to the public. Even the prohibition 
of saloons, that is, where intoxicating liquor is sold and served, to be 
drunk on the premises, cannot be justified on these grounds."198 Al-
though the courts of his day rejected this view, Tiedeman contended 
that it was "the duty of a constitutional jurist to press his views of con-
stitutionallaw upon the attention of the legal world, even though they 
place him in opposition to the current of authority."199 
Although Tiedeman could not justify the prohibition of the li-
quor trade on private property, he found it different when a state acts 
as an owner of property, such as its own offices and buildings, or as 
the guardian of public spaces, such as streets and parks. In the latter 
instance, it may properly constrain conduct, such as public fornication 
or intoxication, that adversely affects other members of the general 
public from enjoying its use. Immoral actions like these, though per-
Tiedeman's conception of "public hann." While private vice, of itself, works no nec-
essary hann on the general public, Tiedeman appears to have thought that the busi-
ness of supplying such vices does. He seems not to have understood that the legal 
suppression of such business creates enonnous hann to the general public. 
196 Id. at 30l. 
197 Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added). 
198 Id. at 307. 
199 Id. at 311. Thus I believe it is wrong to claim that "Cooley and Tiedeman, with 
the characteristic dogmatism of treatise writers, asserted that their views were 'the 
law.''' PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKiNG: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 350 (2000). While Cooley hewed closely to precedent, Tiedeman was a bit 
more nonnative, stating clearly where his views differed with the cases. As a result, 
Tiedeman's thesis was somewhat more radical than Cooley's. Of course, both at-
tempted to synthesize "the law" and in so doing emphasized some authorities while 
de-emphasizing others. 
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mitted behind closed doors, can wrongfully interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of the public sphere by reasonable members of the com-
munity and their children. Provided such restrictions on freedom 
were shown to be necessary to this end and not violative of some other 
constitutional prohibition,20o these sorts of protection of "public 
morals" would be within the Lockean construction of the police 
power of the states identified here. 
On the other hand, were the state allowed the power to prohibit 
any purely private activity on the sole ground that a majority of the legis-
lature deems it to be immoral, there would be no limit on state power 
since no court could review the rationality of such a judgment. As 
between the legislature and a citizen, the legislature would improperly 
be the judge in its own case. Imposing so unlimited a power on non-
consenting citizens would be an illegitimate construction of state 
power in no way mandated by the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion. "[TJhis regulatory power," wrote Bufford, "does not authorize 
interference with individual freedom or individual property to protect 
individuals from doing injury to themselves, unless consequences 
harmful to the public, tend to result."201 
C. Distinguishing Proper From Improper Exercises of State Power 
How can a proper regulation of rightful activity be distinguished 
from an improper abridgment of the private rights of the people? As 
with federal laws, the key is whether state laws are a pretext for pur-
poses other than the prevention of future or rectification of past 
rights violations. "[AJ regulation in the exercise of the police power, 
to be valid must not be unreasonably or unnecessarily burdensome, 
and must have some appreciable tendency towards accomplishing a 
result within the scope of police power."202 One sign that a law is 
pretextual is when it benefits a particular group rather than the gen-
eral public. This type of inquiry was emphasized and developed by 
the courts during the Reconstruction and Progressive Eras. 
Building on the Lockean idea of the "common good," courts ex-
amined whether a particular law benefited every person in the com-
munity as a whole or whether it instead was implemented for the 
benefit of a majority or minority faction (what today would be called a 
"special interest" group). As was stated by Justice Bradley in his Slaugh-
200 Laws that improperly discriminate against some class of citizens, for example, 
would still be barred by the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
or by the modern interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
201 Bufford, supra note 188, at 276. 
202 Id. at 277. 
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ter-House dissent: "[F]undamental rights ... can only be interfered 
with ... by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good 
of all."203 The paradigm of a law that exceeded the police power to 
regulate rightful or prohibit wrongful conduct was a law that, in the 
words of Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull, "takes property from 
A. and gives it to B"204 or from group A to group B. As explained by 
Bufford: 
Thus any law which undertakes to abolish personal or property 
rights, the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the 
rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is 
necessary to provide for the public welfare and general security, is 
not within the police power, but constitutes an unwarrantable inva-
sion of individual rights.205 
"An exercise of legislative powers would be considered valid," ex-
plains Howard Gillman, "only if it could reasonably be justified as con-
tributing to the general welfare. The adjudicative task was to give 
meaning to this standard."206 Gillman has shown how great effort was 
expended by federal and state courts throughout the Progressive Era 
to develop sophisticated doctrines by which special interest legislation 
could be distinguished from general interest legislation that served a 
common good. 
Specifically, it came to be determined, first, that laws that singled 
out specific groups or classes for special treatment would withstand 
constitutional scrutiny only if they could be justified as really related 
to the welfare of the community as a whole ... and were not seen as 
corrupt attempts to use the powers of government to advance 
purely "private" interests ... ; and, second, that acts that interfered 
with an individual's property or market liberty would be considered 
legitimate so long as they were not designed to advance the interests 
of just certain groups or classes.207 
This project actually originated in state courts decades before the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, when interest groups be-
gan organizing to obtain special benefits from early state legisla-
tures.208 Policing the vast array of legislative initiatives consistently 
from statute to statute was not always easy in a system in which a Su-
preme Court of nine Justices oversaw numerous lower federal and 
203 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting). 
204 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,388 (1798) (emphasis omitted). 
205 Bufford, supra note 188, at 275. 
206 GILLMAN, supra note 7, at 49. 
207 [d. at 49-50. 
208 See id. at 45-60. 
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state courts comprised of innumerable judges. Gillman demonstrates 
that, despite the difficulties of such an inquiry, these efforts were re-
markably coherent and also consistent with the political principles of 
the founding generation. 
Gillman's important work has two major themes. The first is that 
"Lochner Era police powers jurisprudence" was both coherent and 
continuous with the underlying principles of the Founding. This 
makes the New Deal rejection of this constitutional jurisprudence a 
revolution, not a restoration. After this revolution, unless a right 
deemed by the Court to be fundamental is violated, "Congress need 
not justify intervention itself, ... need not justifY intervening to favor 
some participants in the economy over others, and ... need not justify 
its choice of favorites.''209 And neither must the states. 
Gillman's second theme is that the animating principle of the 
"Lochner Era" was an aversion to class legislation, not an adherence 
to "laissez-faire." "But 'public purpose' as a limit on the powers of gov-
ernment did not mean 'laissez-faire'; it meant, by and large, class-neu-
tral legislation-legislation that did not impose special burdens or 
benefits on certain market competitors."210 Although Gillman's evi-
dence shows that resistance to class based legislation was undoubtedly 
a touchstone by which reasonable regulation was distinguished from 
arbitrary interference with liberty, I have two small quarrels with this 
last claim. 
First, because Gillman misunderstands "laissez-faire," he is re-
jecting a straw man. Laissez-faire was never a claim that liberty could 
not be regulated. The writings of Cooley and Tiedeman testify to this. 
Therefore, finding that "reasonable" regulations on liberty were up-
held is no evidence that courts were rejecting laissez-faire as a political 
end. Courts that are completely committed to laissez-faire would still 
uphold reasonable regulations of liberty. 
Second, Gillman also underestimates the degree to which the re-
sistance to class based legislation was seen as a means to the protec-
tion of natural rights, rather than an end in itself. That is, the 
identification of class based legislation could well have been thought 
to be a workable standard or doctrine by which infringements on nat-
ural rights could be detected and corrected. Although Gillman never 
really disputes this last point, his continued refrain about the rejection 
of laissez-faire in favor of an aversion to class based legislation sets up 
an opposition that goes beyond his evidence. 
209 Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court's "Return" to Economic Regulation, 1 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 91, 134 (1986). 
210 GILLMAN, supra note 7, at 55. 
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D. Competing Constructions of the Police Power 
Although the Lockean conception of the police power was advo-
cated from the very inception of the Fourteenth Amendment by com-
mentators and jurists seeking to protect the natural liberty rights to 
which it referred, other conceptions of the police power existed as 
well. In particular, other jurists and commentators claimed a broader 
power of states to legislate "in the public interest." To be sure, this 
conception need not necessarily be any broader if one conceives of 
the respect for individual liberty rights to be essential to the achieve-
ment of a genuinely common goOd. 211 Some, however, may see the 
protection of individual liberty rights to be more a hindrance than an 
aid to pursuing the public good. For such persons, so limited a con-
struction of the police power is objectionable. 
Ernst Freund is the scholar most associated with the origins of 
this broader conception of the police power. Writing in 1904, Freund 
rejected the Lockean conception of a police power defined and lim-
ited by the private "common law rights" of individuals. 
But no community confines its care of the public welfare to the en-
forcement of the principles of the common law. The state places its 
corporate and proprietary resources at the disposal of the public by 
the establishment of improvements and services of different kinds; 
and it exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and antici-
pation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through conven-
tional restraints and positive regulations which are not confined to 
the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of state control 
which constitutes the essence of the police power. The maxim of 
this power is that every individual must submit to such restraints in 
the exercise of his liberty or of his rights of property as may be re-
quired to remove or reduce the danger of the abuse of these rights 
on the part of those who are unskillful [sic], careless or 
unscrupulous. 212 
Glenn Reynolds and David Kopel summarize the contrast be-
tween this position and that of Tiedeman as follows: 
[T] he traditional view, espoused by Tiedman [sic], was that state 
power could legitimately be employed to protect individuals from 
direct harm; the newer view, represented by Freund, was that the 
state could regulate even to prevent harms that might not occur, or 
211 This is the thesis of BARNETT, supra note 73. 
212 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
6 (1904) (emphasis omitted). 
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that might not have been considered harms at all by the common 
law.213 
49 1 
Reynolds and Kopel note, however, that even Freund, "the expositor 
of the broad police power theory that dominated legal thought in the 
twentieth century, emphasized that judicial review was still essen-
tial."214 As Freund put the matter: 
Effective judicial limitations on the police power would be impossi-
ble, if the legislature were the sole judge of the necessity of the mea-
sures it enacted .... [T] he maintenance of private rights under the 
requirements of the public welfare is a question of proportionate-
ness of measures entirely. Liberty and property yield to the police 
power, but not to the point of destruction .... 
The question of reasonableness usually resolves itself into this: 
Is regulation carried to the point where it becomes a prohibition, de-
struction, or confiscation?215 
Kopel and Reynolds present much evidence that Freund's view 
was far from the unlimited claim of police power typically posed in 
opposition to the views of Cooley and Tiedeman. For example, they 
note Freund's endorsement of the propriety of regulating the dispo-
sal of dead bodies as a health and safety measure. Still, writes Freund, 
"[p] robably the courts would control legislative discretion were it ex-
ercised in an unreasonable manner. Thus a legislative prohibition of 
cremation on the ground that it is contrary to good morals, would not be 
likely to be acquiesced in by the courts .... "216 Freund acknowledged 
that the legislature could not be the sole judge of its own powers. ''Yet 
if the passage of a statute were conclusive evidence of the existence of 
the danger and of the necessity of the remedy, the power of the legis-
lature in the most important field of the police power would be practi-
cally unrestricted."217 Thus even into the twentieth century, the 
police power had not been construed to be an unlimited power, con-
strained only by the express prohibitions of the Constitution. 
Moreover, the expanded view of the police power in the early 
twentieth century was sometimes conceded, by some who supported 
this expansion, to be in conflict with the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. For example, we find Collins Denny, Jr., of 
Princeton, writing in the Michigan Law Review in praise of Justice 
Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House: 
213 Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observa-
tions for a New Century, 27 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 512 (2000). 
214 Id. at 517. 
215 FREUND, supra note 212, at 60-61 (emphasis added). 
216 Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
217 Id. at 134. 
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The judges were sympathetic with the results of the war in so far as 
they established the principles of territorial sovereignty, but were 
not ready to see the states become powerless and the whole theory 
of our Constitution destroyed. Fortunate indeed were we in having 
such a man as Justice Miller, who in time of great national distur-
bance was able to foresee the inherent danger of this new amend-
ment, and who had the courage to place himself in the path of 
radicalism and check it. 
... This decision rendered valueless the 'privileges and [sic] immu-
nities' clause in extending the national power at the expense of that 
of the states.218 
Denny explicitly praises Miller for deviating from the original 
meaning of the text: "The dissenting judges undoubtedly interpreted 
this amendment as the framers of it had intended."219 Lest one specu-
late about the reason for disregarding and "render[ing] valueless" a 
portion of the Constitution's text as too "radical," Denny makes it ex-
plicit in a truly stunning passage: "It has been very fortunate for [the 
South] that the Supreme Court has given the police power such a 
wide range, and due to this power the South has so far been able to 
ward off the danger arising from her large negro population."22o 
Although an unlimited plenary police power is favored because it 
can be used for good, it can also be used for ill. Hastings saw a simi-
lar origin of the broader claim of police power although, unlike 
Denny, he strongly disapproved. Mter the Civil War, he observed, the 
police power was "needed ... to enable the states to maintain their 
autonomy against the reconstruction legislation of Congress and the 
new amendments. "221 
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment stands as a 
barrier by which those against whom the police power is used can seek 
to defend themselves in Congress and in the courts. So too does the 
original conception of the police power that evolved alongside the 
amendment. As Hastings wrote, the police power "appears clearly 
enough from our decisions, a branch of constitutional law peculiar to 
countries having legislatures with limited power. It is an outgrowth of 
the American conception of protecting the individual from the state. 
218 Denny, supra note 152, at 190-92. 
219 Id. at 191 n.46. 
220 !d. at 201. 
221 Hastings, supra note 165, at 550 (emphasis added). 
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It originated in connection with the discussion of the limitation on 
the legislative powers of the states under our federal system."222 
CONCLUSION 
We can sum up this analysis of the police power of states as fol-
lows: The Fourteenth Amendment does not bar states from prohibit-
ing wrongful exercises of freedom. There is no privilege to violate the 
rights of others, nor any immunity from liability should one do so. In 
nearly all instances, the Constitution leaves the general power to pro-
hibit wrongful conduct where it was before its ratification: in the 
hands of states. It does, however, give Congress the power to prohibit 
and set the punishment for certain identifiable offenses, such as trea-
son and piracy. The powers that came to be called the "police power" 
of the state are far from being inconsistent with the rights retained by 
the people. To the contrary, properly construed, the protection of 
individual rights is at the core of a state's police power. 
A state may also justifY its laws by showing that it is merely regulat-
ing liberty in a way that protects the rights of others. The Fourteenth 
Amendment bars states from "abridging" or violating the privileges or 
immunities of citizenship. It does not bar them from subjecting these 
privileges to publicly accessible "standing rules" of law, provided that 
such rules are also shown to be necessary to protect the rights that 
everyone possesses. In this manner, although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bars the abridgment of liberty and permits liberty-restricting 
laws to be challenged in federal court, it does not prevent legislatures 
from reasonably regulating the exercise of private rights. 
Finally, in addition to prohibiting wrongful and regulating right-
ful private behavior that may injure the rights of others, the state may 
also manage government controlled public space so as to enable 
members of the public to enjoy its use, and may restrict the use of its 
own property provided these regulations and restrictions do not im-
properly violate other constitutional prohibitions on state power. 
All these principles are illustrated nicely by the decision in Law-
rence v. Texas,223 in which the Supreme Court struck down a state stat-
ute criminalizing sexual conduct-or "sodomy"-between persons of 
the same sex. AlthoughJustice Kennedy, writing for the majority, did 
not explicitly employ the view of the police power identified here, his 
opinion could be interpreted as implicitly doing so. He does not find 
222 [d. at 360. 
223 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). I discuss the Lawrence case at greater length in Randy 
E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 21. 
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the prohibited conduct to be the exercise of a "fundamental right" of 
privacy calling for strict scrutiny of the statute. Instead, his opinion 
rests entirely on the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
"We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether 
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in 
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution."224 The bulk of the opinion 
is taken up def~nding the characterization of conduct in question as 
liberty rather than as license: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the 
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres 
of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should 
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. 
The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and 
more transcendent dimensions.225 
Having defined the conduct as liberty, Justice Kennedy then re-
quires the state to have a legitimate reason for interfering with its ex-
ercise. The only reason offered by the government in its defense is 
that the legislature deemed the conduct to be immoral, a justification 
Justice Kennedy found to be inadequate: "the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack."226 
The decision in Lawrence implicitly rejects the view of the police 
power as unlimited and plenary and is entirely compatible with the 
analysis presented here. The defendants in this case were exercising 
their unenumerated right, or liberty, to use their bodies as they chose. 
Because their activity, performed entirely behind closed doors, did 
not wrongfully interfere with the equal rights of others to their per-
sons or property, it is properly characterized as liberty, as opposed to 
licence. By prohibiting the rightful exercise of liberty, the statute ex-
ceeds the proper scope of the police power. 
Although the state could possibly regulate, as opposed to pro-
hibit, a rightful exercise of liberty, such a regulation would have to be 
224 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (emphasis added). 
225 Id. at 2475 (emphases added). 
226 Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,216 (1986) (Stevens,]., 
dissenting» . 
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shown to be necessary to the protection of the rights of others. For 
example, the state might say that if you are to engage in such conduct, 
it must not be done in a public place where members of the general 
public might view it. A bare assertion that the conduct in question is 
immoral is inadequate, however, since such an assertion could always 
be made, potentially justifying any regulation or prohibition. Such a 
construction exceeds the proper scope of the police power because it 
violates the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment-the liberty that, due to the Slaughter-House Cases, is now 
protected instead by the Due Process Clause. 
By the theory of the police power presented here, Lawrence v. 
Texas is, therefore, an easy case. Any effort to identify the proper 
scope of the police power of states requires either Congress or the 
courts to draw a line between permissible and impermissible justifica-
tions for prohibition and regulation of individual conduct. Though 
any effort to draw lines will sometimes be vexatious, Lawrence illus-
trates how it can also be quite straightforward. Whether hard or easy, 
however, the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
rules out the unlimited or plenary conception of state power and 
mandates that states justify any restrictions on the actions of their citi-
zens as within the proper scope of the police power. 
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